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Stare Decisis Is Cognitive Error 
Goutam U. Jois † 
[A]fter [courts] have proceeded a while they get their own set of 
precedents, and precedents save “the intolerable labor of thought,” 
and they fall into grooves, just as judges do. When they get into 
grooves, then God save you to get them out of the grooves. 
—Learned Hand1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For hundreds of years, the practice of stare decisis—a 
court’s adherence to prior decisions in similar cases—has 
guided the common law. However, recent behavioral evidence 
suggests that stare decisis, far from enacting society’s “true 
preferences” with regard to law and policy, may reflect, and 
exacerbate, our cognitive biases. 
The data show that humans are subconsciously primed 
(among other things) to prefer the status quo, to overvalue 
existing defaults, to follow others’ decisions, and to stick to the 
well-worn path. We have strong motives to justify existing 
legal, political, and social systems; to come up with simple 
explanations for observed phenomena; and to construct 
coherent narratives for the world around us. Taken together, 
these and other characteristics suggest that we value precedent 
not because it is desirable but merely because it exists. Three 
case studies—analyzing federal district court cases, U.S. 
Supreme Court cases, and development of American policy on 
torture—suggest that the theory of stare decisis as a heuristic 
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 1 LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF 
LEARNED HAND 241 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1963) (1952). 
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has substantial explanatory power. In its strongest form, this 
hypothesis challenges the foundation of common law systems. 
*  *  * 
A hundred and fifty years ago, Tocqueville wrote that 
the greatest outrage to an Anglo-American lawyer was 
accusing him of having an original thought. If one 
characterized the lawyer as being an innovator, “he will be 
prepared to go to absurd lengths rather than to admit himself 
guilty of so great a crime.”2 The common law system and its 
reliance on precedent, he wrote, forced lawyers to argue as 
though all of the rationale for their clients’ position was 
compelled by pre-existing case law. Tocqueville was “surprised 
to hear [the common lawyer] quoting the opinions of others so 
often and saying so little about his own.”3 Conversely, a lawyer 
in the civil law system would “deal with no matter, however 
trivial, without . . . carry[ing] the argument right back to the 
constituent principles of the laws.”4 
Change comes slowly to the common lawyer. He “values 
laws not because they are good but because they are old,” and if 
the law must be changed in some respect, “he has recourse to 
the most incredible subtleties in order to persuade himself that 
in adding something to the work of his fathers he has only 
developed their thought and completed their work.”5 Innovation 
is anathema to him. 
Recent social psychological evidence suggests that 
Tocqueville was on to something—about all of us, not just those 
of us trained in the common law. Across a wide range of 
contexts, the data provide compelling evidence of humans’ 
tendencies to prefer existing social systems and status quo 
endowments and a simultaneous subconscious “priming” to 
justify those existing defaults. If this is true, then the Anglo-
American legal system, with its emphasis on stare decisis and 
adherence to precedent, exacerbates this human shortcoming. 
Thence arises the title of this Article. Relying on 
precedent might be a good idea, or it might not. But it is clear 
that, rather than reflecting our “true preferences,” the theory 
and practice of stare decisis are at least partially rooted in our 
cognitive biases. There are two ways this could be the case. 
  
 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 268 (George Lawrence 
trans., J.P. Mayer ed. 1969). 
 3 Id. at 267. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. at 268. 
2009] STARE DECISIS IS COGNITIVE ERROR 65 
First, the practice of stare decisis may have evolved merely as a 
reflection of cognitive bias, and nothing more. This is the 
strongest, and most provocative, version of my argument. 
Second, the current practice of stare decisis may be yielding 
judicial decisions that are at least partially the product of 
heuristic judgments, resulting in socially-suboptimal results. 
I use the term “precedent” very broadly here. Legal 
doctrine may expand or limit the role of precedent in various 
contexts.6 However, as Frederick Schauer points out in his 
seminal article, Precedent: 
Appeals to precedent do not reside exclusively in courts of law. 
Forms of argument that may be concentrated in the legal system are 
rarely isolated there, and the argument from precedent is a prime 
example of the nonexclusivity of what used to be called “legal 
reasoning.” Think of the child who insists that he should not have to 
wear short pants to school because his older brother was allowed to 
wear long pants when he was seven. Or think of the bureaucrat who 
responds to the supplicant for special consideration by saying that 
“we’ve never done it that way before.” In countless instances, out of 
law as well as in, the fact that something was done before provides, 
by itself, a reason for doing it that way again. 
Reliance on precedent is part of life in general.7 
Even though most of my examples are from court 
decisions, I use this broad conception of precedent in this 
Article—the form of reasoning that we humans use on a 
regular basis and one that affects almost every mode of legal 
analysis. This does not mean that reliance on precedent will 
always produce bad results. It does mean that we should be 
skeptical of legal rules that become entrenched merely by 
virtue of their longevity. As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote 
in The Path of the Law: 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it 
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the 
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and 
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.8 
  
 6 See, e.g., infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
 7 Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 572 (1987) 
[hereinafter Schauer, Precedent]. Of course, I do not want to overplay this point. 
Schauer himself acknowledges that reasoning from precedent is certainly concentrated, 
and more important, in law than elsewhere. Id. 
 8 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 
469 (1897). 
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A century earlier, Thomas Jefferson espoused a similar 
view. Requiring one generation to live under a Constitution set 
out by its predecessor, he wrote, was like “requir[ing] a man to 
still wear the coat which fitted him when a boy.”9 To right this 
perceived wrong, he believed that the Constitution should 
contain a provision “for its revision at stated periods.”10 
Jefferson suggested that a mechanism for “doing this every 
nineteen or twenty years, should be provided by the 
Constitution; so that it may be handed on, with periodical 
repairs, from generation to generation.”11 
In this sense, Jefferson’s ideas were anti-Burkean. 
Edmund Burke, the father of modern conservatism, implored men 
to trade on the “general bank and capital of nations, and of ages,” 
and to distrust their own “private stock of reason.”12 Jefferson 
disagreed: “Each generation is as independent as the one 
preceding, as that was of all which had gone before. It has then, 
like them, a right to choose for itself the form of government it 
believes most promotive of its own happiness . . . .”13 
Yet the common law system does not allow each court, 
or even each generation, to “choose for itself” that which “it 
believes most promotive of its own happiness,” making it more 
Burkean than Jeffersonian. In the American system, if an issue 
under consideration has been directly decided by the Supreme 
Court, lower courts are bound to reach the same result, “unless 
and until [the Supreme] Court reinterpret[s] the binding 
precedent.”14 A lower court cannot disregard the rule merely 
because it thinks an alternative would be “most promotive of 
[the current generation’s] happiness.” It cannot even disregard 
the legal rule if “the grounds upon which it was laid down have 
vanished long since.”15 As the Supreme Court has explained, “If 
a precedent of [the Supreme] Court has direct application in a 
  
 9 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (June 12, 1816), in 15 
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 32, 42 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh 
eds., 1904). 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. at 41. Jefferson did not arrive at the time frame by accident. The 
mortality tables of his day suggested that the majority of adults living in a given 
generation would be dead within nineteen years. Id. This gives rise to the shorthand 
formulation, that Jefferson believed that the Constitution should be rewritten every 
generation. 
 12 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 183 (W. 
Alison Phillips & Catherine Beatrice Phillips eds., 1912) (1790). 
 13 Jefferson, supra note 9, at 42. 
 14 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 238 (1997). 
 15 Holmes, supra note 8, at 469. 
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case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of 
decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which 
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of 
overruling its own decisions.”16 As a result, “[j]udges are . . . 
obliged to answer the same question in the same way as others 
have answered it earlier, even if they would prefer to answer it 
differently.”17 
And so Jefferson and Holmes have not been heeded. 
Despite their protestations, we are old men wearing boys’ coats, 
abiding rules laid down in the time of Henry IV.18 
However, there is more to this story. The provocative 
title notwithstanding, the thesis of this Article is not (only) that 
stare decisis is cognitive error. I want to draw further 
conclusions about the implications of cognitive bias for the 
common law system. Over the years, evidence from social 
psychology has made increasingly clear that humans’ actions 
do not conform to the “rational actor model,” as had been 
supposed, implicitly or explicitly, by economic and legal theory 
for decades. Evidence in the behavioral literature suggests that 
we humans tend to overvalue existing, historical, and 
traditional arrangements. Our cognitive biases are correlated, 
and they all suggest an undue reliance on the past. This ought 
to be of concern to lawyers, because the cornerstone of our legal 
system is reliance on prior decisions. 
There are three possibilities: First, our common law 
system, and stare decisis, might be nothing more than 
reflections of a constellation of correlated cognitive biases. If 
this is true, then we are substantially worse off for relying on 
precedent, in all cases and at all levels, than we would be in a 
system where each case was approached with a blank slate. 
Second, in the weaker version of the argument, reliance on 
  
 16 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson, 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (emphasis 
added). 
 17 Frederick Schauer, Why Precedent in Law (and Elsewhere) is Not Totally 
(or Even Substantially) About Analogy, 3 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 454, 454-60 (2008) 
[hereinafter Schauer, Analogy]. 
 18 This may actually understate the problem somewhat. King Henry IV ruled 
from 1589 to 1610. See JOHN P. MCKAY ET AL., 2 A HISTORY OF WORLD SOCIETIES, 466 
(8th ed. 2008). Meanwhile, the Rule in Shelley’s Case, (1581) 1 Co. Rep. 93b (K.B.), 
actually predates the time of Henry IV. And there are several United States 
jurisdictions that still adhere to the rule, at least in part. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & 
JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 298-99 (5th ed. 2002) (describing the rule); id. at 300 
(noting that the rule still applies in Arkansas and to pre-abolition wills in jurisdictions 
that have abolished the rule non-retroactively, including Ohio, Illinois, and North 
Carolina). 
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precedent might generally be desirable. However, in close 
cases, judges should not rely on precedent, absent special 
justification, because they might be relying on precedent as a 
heuristic—a cognitive shortcut—and not because it yields the 
desirable result. Third and last, in the weakest version of the 
story, the fact that humans (and courts) are susceptible to 
these biases, while perhaps noteworthy, should not lead to any 
doctrinal change. In this weakest version, the argument in this 
Article would likely have little role to play in the context of 
“vertical stare decisis,” but some role in the context of 
“horizontal stare decisis.”19  
This is not the first article to explore the implications of 
behavioral phenomena on the law. Nonetheless, it fills a gap in 
the existing literature in at least three ways. First, it builds on 
the extensive literature that has explained, in general terms, 
how insights from social psychology can and should change our 
understanding of legal theory.20 Second, it continues the 
tradition of authors like Cass Sunstein (on information 
cascades),21 Lawrence Lessig (on social norms),22 and Adrian 
  
 19 Vertical stare decisis refers to the obligation of a lower court to follow the 
binding precedent set by a higher court in its jurisdiction. Horizontal stare decisis 
refers to the presumption that a court will decide current matters in line with the 
earlier decisions of the same court. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, 
An Empirical Investigation into Appellate Structure and the Perceived Quality of 
Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1745, 1750-51 (2008) (describing the two kinds of 
stare decisis). 
 20 Jon Hanson and his co-authors have been most prolific in this regard. The 
tandem articles The Situation and The Situational Character were groundbreaking 
articles that displaced the rational actor model with the “situational” model, informed 
by insights from social psychology. See generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The 
Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power 
Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003) [hereinafter Hanson & 
Yosifon, The Situation]; Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A 
Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1 (2004) [hereinafter 
Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character]. Hanson’s more recent three-part project 
explains how situational insights explain recent trends in the development of legal 
doctrine and legal theory. See generally Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great 
Attributional Divide: How Divergent Views of Human Behavior are Shaping Legal 
Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311 (2008); Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Naïve Cynicism: 
Maintaining False Perceptions in Policy Debates, 57 EMORY L.J. 499 (2008); Adam 
Benforado & Jon Hanson, Legal Academic Backlash: The Response of Legal Theorists to 
Situationist Insights, 57 EMORY L.J. 1087 (2008). 
 21 See generally Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and 
Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131 (2006). 
 22 See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995). 
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Vermeule (on group decision-making),23 who explore the 
implications of specific psychological findings on the law. Third, 
the Article expands on works of authors who have focused on 
discrete psychological phenomena and written about them in 
the context of specific legal doctrines: the stickiness of default 
rules in contract law;24 the endowment effect with regard to 
injunctions;25 reimagining tort law26 or corporate law27 in light of 
social psychology; and so on.  
The literature has thus far focused on broad questions 
of legal theory (by authors like Hanson) or on specific 
phenomena and doctrines (by Sunstein, Lessig, Vermeule, and 
others). This Article, focusing on the process of legal reasoning, 
is situated at the niche between broader questions of legal 
theory and more specific doctrinal questions. 
This Article has three main parts. In Part II, I survey 
arguments for stare decisis. These arguments sound one (or 
more) of three themes: stare decisis (1) is more likely to lead to 
correct results; (2) fosters stability, predictability, and 
efficiency; (3) enhances the legitimacy of the courts. 
In Part III, I catalogue various psychological 
phenomena that undercut arguments for stare decisis: we 
humans have a tendency to prefer the status quo (status quo 
bias); to overvalue existing entitlements (endowment effect); to 
make decisions based on others’ choices (information cascades); 
and more. In addition, we are motivated to seek reasons for our 
choices that support existing legal, political, and social systems 
(system justification theory); to create coherent patterns from 
past occurrences (motive to cohere); and to develop simple 
explanations for observed phenomena (motive to simplify). 
Taken together, these phenomena cast significant doubt on 
arguments for stare decisis. 
In Part IV, the heart of the Article, I describe three case 
studies that support my hypothesis. First, I make a series of 
  
 23 See generally Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism and the 
Limits of Reason, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1482 (2007) [hereinafter Vermeule, Common 
Law Constitutionalism]. 
 24 Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 
33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651 (2006). 
 25 Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1227 (2003). 
 26 Jon Hanson & Michael McCann, Situationist Torts, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1345 (2008). 
 27 Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimizing 
Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
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predictions regarding when a court’s decision is more likely to 
reflect heuristic judgments rather than cogent reasoning. I 
examine court cases analyzing whether there is an implied 
private right of action under section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, and conclude that the evolution of this legal rule over the 
past several years strongly suggests that the decisions reflect 
cognitive bias. In the second case study, I summarize Anuj 
Desai’s recent articles regarding the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on certain First and Fourth Amendment 
doctrines to argue that this line of cases reflects the Supreme 
Court’s reliance on precedent as a heuristic. Third, I find 
evidence of cognitive bias in the recent (and still-unfolding) 
series of developments with regard to the debate over the 
definition of torture and the treatment of detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The issue of torture, in this context, 
arose against the background of the Global War on Terror. The 
war has led the American legal system into uncharted 
territory. In this situation, if anywhere, one might expect 
courts and policymakers to approach the questions presented 
with a clean slate. I will attempt to show that their 
unwillingness (or inability) to do so suggests a reliance on 
precedent not for its informational value, but because of 
decision-makers’ attempt to seek out patterns and coherent 
doctrinal stories. 
With these lessons in mind, Part V lays out three 
possible versions of my argument, which I alluded to above: 
that the practice of stare decisis is always unreliable; that stare 
decisis should be abandoned in close cases only; or that the 
Article’s insights should result in no doctrinal changes. I leave 
it to the reader to decide which explication of the theory is most 
persuasive.  
II. ARGUMENTS FOR STARE DECISIS 
We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private 
stock of reason, because we suspect that this stock in each man is 
small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves 
of the general bank and capital of nations, and of ages. 
—Edmund Burke28 
In general, this Article takes aim at the practice of stare 
decisis and argues that, at least in certain situations and within 
  
 28 BURKE, supra note 12, at 183. 
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certain constraints, stare decisis may be unreliable. It is not my 
intention here to describe all of the arguments for stare decisis. 
Indeed, the nature and doctrinal scope of stare decisis vary by 
context: constitutional cases versus non-constitutional cases;29 
“pure” common-law cases, like contracts or torts, versus 
statutory cases;30 in specific states, federal courts, or 
international courts;31 and so on. These fine distinctions have 
practical and theoretical relevance in context. However, in this 
Article, I paint with a broad brush. I rely on the more general 
conception of stare decisis: “[t]he doctrine of precedent, under 
which a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the 
same points arise again in litigation.”32 Stare decisis may have a 
horizontal component (where a court follows its own earlier-
decided cases) and a vertical component (where a lower court 
follows a higher court’s earlier decided cases).33 I also use the 
terms “stare decisis” and “precedent” interchangeably, although 
  
 29 See, e.g., Thomas E. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the 
Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 703-04 (1999) (“Amidst all 
the contradictions and retractions in the modern Court’s doctrine of precedent, one 
point has achieved an unusual degree of consensus: that stare decisis has ‘great weight 
. . . in the area of statutory construction’ but ‘is at its weakest’ in constitutional cases.” 
(quoting Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 
203, 235-38 (1997))); cf. Lee J. Strang & Bryce G. Poole, The Historical (In)accuracy of 
the Brandeis Dichotomy: An Assessment of the Two-Tiered Standard of Stare Decisis for 
Supreme Court Precedents, 86 N.C. L. REV. 969 (2008) (criticizing the dichotomy 
described above). Strang and Poole cite opinions by a variety of justices to demonstrate 
that this dichotomy has purchase on the Court along the political spectrum. See id. at 
971-72 (citing Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice O’Connor, and Justice 
Breyer). 
 30 See, e.g., MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW, at vii 
(1988) (noting in the Preface that his book focuses on “that part of the law that is not 
based on [authoritative] texts,” and that “the same set of principles” does not apply to 
“the interpretation of constitutions, the interpretation of statutes, and the 
establishment of common law rules”); see also Rafael Gely, Of Sinking and Escalating: 
A (Somewhat) New Look at Stare Decisis, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 89, 109 (1998) (“[C]ommon 
law precedents enjoy a presumption of correctness stronger than that applied to 
constitutional cases, but not as constraining as that enjoyed by statutory precedents.”); 
Brian C. Kalt, Three Levels of Stare Decisis: Distinguishing Common-Law, 
Constitutional, and Statutory Cases, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 277, 277-78 (2004). 
 31 See, e.g., Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past: Toward De Jure Stare Decisis in 
WTO Adjudication, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 873, 876 (2001); Thomas G. Field III, 
The Role of Stare Decisis in the Federal Circuit, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 203, 204 (1999); Steven 
Gardner, Contributory Negligence, Comparative Negligence, and Stare Decisis in North 
Carolina, 18 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 3 (1996); David A. Hartquist et al., Toward a Fuller 
Appreciation of Nonacquiescence, Collateral Estoppel, and Stare Decisis in the U.S. 
Court of International Trade, 14 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 112, 112 (1991); Jeffrey T. Renz, 
Stare Decisis in Montana, 65 MONT. L. REV. 41, 42 (2004); Mark Sabel, The Role of 
Stare Decisis in Construing the Alabama Constitution of 1901, 53 ALA. L. REV. 273, 274 
(2001). 
 32 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009). 
 33 See, e.g., Nash & Pardo, supra note 19, at 1750-51. 
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there is a slight difference between the two terms.34 I use them 
interchangeably because “[w]hat I say here applies to both kinds 
of precedent.”35 The argument in this Article may have more or 
less relevance in a particular doctrinal context, as the scope and 
role of precedent varies, but the basic point is the same. 
Nonetheless, regardless of the context, stare decisis is 
defended for one or more of three primary reasons. First, stare 
decisis is defended because it is more likely to lead to correct 
results. This line of argument has its roots in Edmund Burke 
and other Burkean scholars, who argue that the reasoning 
ability of any given individual is small and that he would do 
better to rely on the received wisdom of his forebears. The 
Condorcet Jury Theorem is a different, but related, version of 
this argument.36 The Theorem argues that under certain 
constraints, as the number of decision-makers increases, the 
probability of reaching the correct result approaches one.37 
Therefore, individual decision-making power is low; answers by 
large groups, over time, are more likely to be correct. 
Second, stare decisis is defended on legal positivist 
grounds. These arguments generally bracket the question of 
whether the received rule is correct or not. Instead, they 
contend that reliance on established legal doctrines makes the 
law more stable over time; more predictable so that parties can 
arrange their matters in accordance with the law; and more 
efficient and therefore welfare-enhancing. In this Article, I use 
the shorthand “stability, predictability, and efficiency” to refer 
to these related arguments in support of stare decisis. 
Finally, stare decisis is defended on the grounds that it 
preserves the legitimacy of the judiciary. In Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey,38 the plurality reasoned that it was 
obligated to uphold the “essential holding” of Roe v. Wade, in 
  
 34 See Schauer, Analogy, supra note 17, at 6 n.2 (“Technically, the obligation 
of a court to follow previous decisions of the same court is referred to as stare decisis 
(‘stand by what has been decided’), and the more encompassing term precedent is used 
to refer both to stare decisis and the obligation of a lower court to follow decisions of a 
higher one.”). 
 35 Id. 
 36 See, e.g., Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism, supra note 23, at 
1485-1501 (discussing “Burke as Condorcet”). But see David L. Shapiro, The Role of 
Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication: An Introspection, 86 TEX. L. REV. 929, 943 
n.49 (2008) (finding Vermeule’s argument “ultimately unpersua[sive]”). 
 37 See, e.g., Paul H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury 
Theorem, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 327, 328 (2002). 
 38 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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part to preserve “institutional integrity.”39 The plurality noted, 
among other things, that “the Court’s legitimacy depends on 
making legally principled decisions.”40 If courts’ rulings were 
subject to the whims of the particular judge, then the public 
would lose faith in the judiciary.  
A. Burkean Traditionalism 
In its most basic form, stare decisis—“[t]he doctrine of 
precedent, under which a court must follow earlier judicial 
decisions when the same points arise again in litigation”41—acts 
as a check on radical change. If a court at time t+1 is obligated 
to follow the decision of the court at time t, then it is less likely 
to be able to propound its own view of the case. Stare decisis 
acts as a limit on the ability of a given court to rely on its 
“private stock of reason.” In this sense, stare decisis has 
Burkean elements to it, undergirded by a sense that prior 
decisions are more likely to be correct than newer decisions.  
In Reflections on the Revolution in France, Burke 
explained his disagreement with the French Revolution: 
though the movement’s values were ostensibly desirable, it was 
essentially a quick attempt to change the political structure of 
the French government. Rather than sudden change, Burke 
favored the wisdom found in tradition and noted the 
importance of connecting the current political system to the 
past: 
By this unprincipled facility of changing the state as often, and as 
much, and in as many ways as there are floating fancies or fashions, 
the whole chain and continuity of the commonwealth would be 
broken. No one generation could link with the other. Men would 
become little better than the flies of a summer.”42  
Burke explains that by abandoning traditions, people 
actually limit their own capabilities since they falsely believe 
they possess enough knowledge to create new political 
structures. Instead of working with the structures of the past 
to create a more stable government, they reduce themselves to 
“flies of a summer” with fleeting notions of how government 
ought to function.43  
  
 39 Id. at 845-46. 
 40 Id. at 866. 
 41 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 32, at 1537. 
 42 BURKE, supra note 12, at 91-92. 
 43 Id. 
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Although Burke was not opposed to generating new 
ideas in general, he was opposed to their rapid implementation 
since he believed such an act was an insult to past generations 
of thinkers, as well as an abandonment of their legacy. The 
present generation, according to Burke, were simply 
“temporary-possessors” of their laws and constitutional 
heritage.44 Therefore, “they should not think it amongst their 
right to cut off the entail, or commit waste on the inheritance, 
by destroying at their pleasure the whole original fabric of their 
society.”45 If they did, they would not only “leave . . . a ruin” to 
those who came after them but also “teach[] these successors as 
little to respect the[ new institutions] as they had themselves 
respected the institutions of their forefathers.”46 The past ought 
to be bellowed not merely because it was probably correct, but 
also because failure to do so demonstrated a lack of respect for 
one’s forebears. 
Russell Kirk reflects on Burke’s desire to retain the 
wisdom of our predecessors, explaining that for Burke, “In the 
government of the nation, the people participated through their 
representatives—not delegates, but representatives, elected 
from the ancient corporate bodies of the nation, rather than 
from an amorphous mass of subjects.”47 In other words, “ancient 
corporate bodies” still play a role in the present-day political 
system since their contributions make up essential elements of 
our current system of law.48 A rapid abandonment of such 
contributions would result in unforeseen consequences.  
This kind of Burkean thinking underlies (implicitly if 
not explicitly) the common law system, which relies on case law 
and precedent to help determine the outcome of current cases: 
“A constitutional order with a strong dose of common-law 
judicial definition and a proclaimed fidelity to precedent pushes 
in a Burkean direction.”49 This theory of constitutional 
interpretation, implicit in the common law, “f[ound] its most 
famous expression in Burke’s great work.”50 Rather than 
  
 44 Id. at 91. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND: FROM BURKE TO ELLIOT 18 (7th 
ed. 2001). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Samuel Issacharoff, Meriwether Lewis, the Air Force, and the Surge: The 
Problem of Constitutional Settlement, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 649, 668 (2008). 
 50 David A. Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn’t Be Originalists, 31 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 969, 973 (2008) (citation omitted). 
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determine how best to promote its own happiness, a given 
generation must be humble and respect the limits of 
rationality.51 Although “judgments about morality, fairness, and 
justice” are permissible, they are only permissible “within the 
narrow confines left open by tradition.”52  
Strauss, in turn, cites Calabresi, who writes that “in our 
constitutional culture there is actually a well-established 
Burkean practice and tradition of venerating the text and first 
principles of the Constitution and of appealing to it to trump 
both contrary case law and contrary practices and traditions.”53 
 Similarly—and still in the Burkean vein—defenders of 
stare decisis argue that overruling past decisions, even if they 
currently seem incorrect in the eyes of the judges, may prove a 
worse option, given that overturning precedent requires a sort 
of epistemological arrogance on the part of current judges.54 
Nelson explains that “this was particularly true when a long 
line of decisions had all reached the same conclusion. If a series 
of judges had all deemed something to be a ‘correct’ statement 
of the unwritten law, a later judge who doubted the statement 
ought to be modest enough to question his own position.”55 
Thus, both as a form of respect for tradition that Burke 
stressed, as well as for the actual information contained in 
precedent, prior decisions ought to be followed.  
  
 51 Id. Some contemporary authors, such as David Brooks, have written about 
the limits of human rationality. See, e.g., David Brooks, The Social Animal, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 12, 2008, at A23. But Brooks and others in the Burkean vein take this in a 
different direction than I do. Brooks argues that, because humans’ rationality is 
limited, we should be skeptical of programs that seek to impose broad-based change: 
the agenda of those who seek reform, he writes, are based on purportedly optimal, 
rational models; because humans are not perfectly rational, the reform is likely to fall 
short of its stated goals. See, e.g., David Brooks, The Big Test, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 
2009, at A25. Thus, Brooks relies on social psychology to argue in favor of Burkean 
traditionalism. See id. (acknowledging that “Burke ha[s] a point” and explaining that 
broad-scale agendas of change “set off my Burkean alarm bells”). Conversely, (one piece 
of) my argument is that Burkeanism itself could be seen as reflection of the status quo 
bias, endowment effect, and so forth. Brooks cites deviations from the rational actor 
model as a reason to be wary of large-scale efforts to address social problems. My 
argument is the opposite: we should be willing to entertain large-scale change (such as 
reimagining the role of precedent in our legal system)—but we should do so in a way 
that acknowledges how people really act, not an idealized vision of how they might act. 
 52 Strauss, supra note 50, at 973. 
 53 Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, 
Precedent, and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 637 (2006). 
 54 See Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedent, 87 
VA. L. REV. 1, 34 (2001). 
 55 Id. 
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B. Stability, Predictability, Efficiency 
The Burkean position, that precedent should be followed 
because it was likely to be correct, undergirded the view, 
dominant in the nineteenth century, that the common law is 
the repository of the collected rationality of the Anglo-
American people.56 Edward Rubin characterizes this as 
“Langdell’s mythology,” but one that has persisted for quite 
some time.57 However, as Rubin points out, for over a century, it 
had been clear that the common law was not a “natural” 
institution that reflected the right answers to all legal 
questions.58 Instead, it arose out of an effort by King Henry II 
“to suppress dissension by displacing local law in England with 
a system of royal justice that would be common to the entire 
realm.”59 Under this conception, reliance on precedent is 
desirable for instrumental reasons: it makes the law uniform, 
predictable, and stable.  
In a civil law system, courts are generally not bound by 
prior decisions; they are always free to change course.60 In the 
common law, however, stare decisis binds future courts to 
reach the same conclusion as prior courts, furthering the 
predictability of law.61 Maltz gives a sharp example of the role 
of stare decisis in fostering predictability:  
As an illustration of the point, consider the action of the Michigan 
Supreme Court in Parker v. Port Huron Hospital. In Parker the court 
abrogated the doctrine of charitable immunity, which had prevailed 
in the state since the decision in Downes v. Harper Hospital. 
Challenging the decision to overrule Downes, one might well 
  
 56 Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong With Langdell’s Method, and What to Do 
About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609, 623-26 (2007). 
 57 Id. at 623-26. 
 58 Id. at 616-31. 
 59 Id. at 627. 
 60 1 MARCEL PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW § 123 (La. State L. Inst. 
trans., 12th ed. 1939). 
 61 Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 368-69 (1988). I 
should note that my argument has some application in civil law systems as well. The 
doctrine of jurisprudence constante, under which a particular rule of law is to be given 
weight if many courts have reached that same decision, is the civil law analogue to the 
common law’s stare decisis. One distinction between the doctrines is that jurisprudence 
constante requires a large number of courts to have reached the same conclusion, while 
a single case can have precedential effect in a common law system. See, e.g., Willis-
Knighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use Tax Comm’n., 903 So.2d 1071, 
1088 n.17 (La. 2005). The concerns I highlight below, such as cascades, status quo bias, 
and so on, apply even in the civil law context. The problem may be mitigated because 
jurisprudence constante has persuasive, rather than binding, effect, see, e.g., Doerr v. 
Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 128 (La. 2000), but it would be present nonetheless. 
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conclude that charitable institutions planned their activities and 
budgets with the assumption that they would be immune from tort 
liability. Based on the same assumptions, these institutions may 
have failed to obtain liability insurance. Thus, the argument would 
conclude, Parker was wrongly decided because it defeated the 
justified expectations of the institutions relying on the Downes rule.62 
By this argument, stare decisis enables individuals to 
predict consequences and act accordingly. This also prompts 
stability in the law, since judges cannot make arbitrary 
decisions. This could be particularly true in property law: “if 
titles had passed in reliance on [prior rules] or if people had 
otherwise conducted transactions in accordance with them—
the resulting reliance interests could provide a reason to 
adhere to decisions even if they were now deemed erroneous.”63 
In such cases, maintaining a commitment to past decisions in 
order to ensure and protect reliance interests remains an 
important feature of the argument in favor of the advantages of 
stare decisis, even against critics’ claims that an “important 
value is getting the right answer to critical questions of 
constitutional meaning.”64 The Supreme Court has endorsed 
such a view, commenting that “[c]onsiderations in favor of stare 
decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and 
contract rights, where reliance interests are involved.”65 The 
instrumentalist view finds perhaps its most famous expression 
in the words of Justice Brandeis: “Stare decisis is usually the 
wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that 
the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled 
right.”66 Stare decisis prevents the disruption that would occur 
if judges were constantly seeking the “correct” rule.  
Relying on precedent also helps ensure efficiency in the 
common law system. Cardozo explains that by relying on 
precedent, current judges expedite the decision-making 
process. Through stare decisis, “[a] stock of judicial conceptions 
and formulas is developed, and we take them, so to speak, 
  
 62 Id. (citations omitted). Maltz goes on to note, however, that the new rule 
was made prospective in application, so charities that had relied on the old rule would 
not be affected. Id. at 369. 
 63 Nelson, supra note 54, at 20. 
 64 Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some 
Originalist and Normative Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 311, 329 (2005). 
 65 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991). 
 66 Burnet v. Coronado Oil, 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
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ready-made.”67 Thus, judges can draw on this bank, avoid 
having to rethink each legal question, and consider more cases 
than would be otherwise possible.68 “[T]he labor of judges would 
be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision 
could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one’s 
own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses 
laid by others who had gone before him.”69 This argument has 
found purchase even at the Supreme Court.70 
Some critics argue that relying on precedent without 
recognizing that past decisions might have been incorrect is 
misguided. However, supporters of stare decisis point out that 
the benefits of maintaining past decisions far outweigh the 
consequences. In fact, while Nelson recognizes there might be 
instances where past precedent is undoubtedly incorrect, 
falling beyond even the wide range of possible outcomes 
associated with each case, he suggests that these instances 
might be the exception and in general, upholding stare decisis 
proves more valuable than not.71 
There is another component to the argument that stare 
decisis promotes efficiency. Some scholars argue, essentially 
following Posner, that the common law system is and has been 
geared toward economic efficiency. In their classic book on tort 
law, Landes and Posner write that “the common law of torts is 
best explained as if the judges who created the law . . . were 
trying to promote efficient resource allocation.”72 Posner does 
not cabin this theory to tort law; he believes that the common 
law is best explained as a system of wealth-maximizing rules.73 
“The gist of that contention is that in a common law system 
there are incentives for repeat players to litigate inefficient 
rules but not to litigate efficient rules; [however judges decide a 
case,] this mechanism will inevitably lead to an increase in the 
stock of efficient legal rules.”74 This convergence-on-efficiency 
  
 67 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 47-48 (1921). 
 68 Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern 
of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 626 (2001). 
 69 CARDOZO, supra note 67, at 149. 
 70 Fla. Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Services v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 
U.S. 147, 154 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that “[t]hese concerns are not . . . 
insubstantial”) (citing CARDOZO, supra note 67, at 149). 
 71 Id. 
 72 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
TORT LAW 1 (1987). 
 73 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 26 (6th ed. 2003). 
 74 Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S. Ulen, The Market for Legal Innovation: Law 
and Economics in Europe and the United States, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1555, 1589 (2008). 
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theory has its roots in Lord Mansfield’s proclamation that the 
common law “works itself pure,”75 the hypothesis that bad rules 
will get weeded out over time.  
Thus, whether the focus is on the time that judges save 
or the maximization of social wealth, scholars for centuries 
have argued that reliance on precedent furthers efficiency.76 
C. Judicial Legitimacy 
Courts follow precedent because it is correct or in the 
interest of stability. But they also do so for a third reason: 
because it furthers judicial legitimacy: “One of the most widely 
shared values in the American political system is that 
principles governing society should be ‘rules of law and not 
merely the opinions of a small group of men who temporarily 
occupy high office.’ The doctrine of stare decisis reinforces this 
value . . . .”77 Maltz points out that stare decisis (1) simply 
makes judicial decisions look better, because the instant 
decision is based on pre-existing law and not impulsive 
preferences; and (2) implies a judicial role of “law-finding” and 
not “law-making,” a value that does in fact limit judicial 
discretion.78 
Along these lines, Nelson notes, “According to many 
commentators, frequent overruling jeopardizes public 
acceptance of the courts’ decisions.”79 The joint opinion of 
Justices Souter, Kennedy, and O’Connor in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey states, “[t]he Court’s power lies . . . in its 
legitimacy.”80 Nelson explains that for these Justices it was 
important to adhere to the core holding of Roe v. Wade so that 
the country would not lose “confidence in the Judiciary.”81 In 
this respect, stare decisis helps maintain the legitimacy of the 
court. In the absence of stare decisis, the public might lose faith 
  
 75 Omychund v. Barker, (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 23 (Ch.). 
 76 Most behavioral critiques of the common law tend to focus on this 
efficiency argument. For example, Hanson and Hart have argued persuasively that the 
famous “BPL” formula developed by Judge Learned Hand, often cited as an example of 
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 77 Maltz, supra note 61, at 371 (citation omitted). 
 78 Id. at 371-72. 
 79 Nelson, supra note 54, at 68. 
 80 505 U.S. 833, 983 (1992). 
 81 Nelson, supra note 54, at 68 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 865, 867). 
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in the courts and therefore doubt the strength of the rule of 
law. 
D. Conclusion 
In short, stare decisis is defended for any or all of the 
preceding reasons. In the next Part, I catalogue common 
cognitive and psychological phenomena that undercut these 
arguments for stare decisis. 
III. COGNITIVE BIASES THAT UNDERCUT ARGUMENTS FOR 
STARE DECISIS 
If precedent represents a weak or impoverished learning device, then 
a common law system of adjudication seems unlikely to produce 
reliable results.82 
As described in the previous Part, there are many 
reasons a system of stare decisis is desirable. These goals 
might be worth pursuing and might even be correct on their 
own terms. Nevertheless, the behavioral literature of recent 
years gives us serious reason to question the epistemic basis of 
those arguments. In turn, we should be skeptical of using stare 
decisis as a decisional guidepost. In this Part, I survey that 
behavioral literature. 
Three preliminary points are in order: First, the 
following discussion is not meant to be exhaustive. There may 
be other behavioral phenomena that support my thesis; I only 
discuss those that are most relevant to my argument and 
relatively well known. Second, I do not discuss the phenomena 
in much depth. I summarize the key findings of the literature 
to the extent necessary to develop the doctrinal application of 
the literature. The interested reader can find citations to the 
underlying papers, studies, and experiments in the footnotes. 
Finally, much of the discussion tracks that set forth by Hanson 
and Yosifon in The Situational Character, which provides some 
  
 82 Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: A Critical Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 
87, 91 (1999). Talley ultimately concludes that precedent cannot be fully explained by 
cascades. Id. at 92. But crucially, he reaches this conclusion because his analysis 
focuses exclusively on cascades and not other cognitive biases. See id. Unlike Talley’s 
paper, my analysis surveys a variety of cognitive and behavioral phenomena. The 
position I advance is not that precedent represents an information cascade, but that a 
broad range of phenomena (including cascades) suggest that precedent may not be 
advancing the goals we think it advances for the reasons we think it is advancing 
them. I respond more fully to Talley near the end of this Article. See infra notes 376-
382 and accompanying text. 
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more detail on the phenomena I discuss as well as a broader 
survey of such phenomena.83  
At the end of this Part, I make a bold claim: the 
behavioral evidence gives us very strong reason to believe that 
the common law system (1) reflects cognitive biases; (2) 
magnifies cognitive biases; or (3) does both. I use “common law” 
loosely here. The critique applies to typical common law 
subjects, like contracts or torts, but also to statutory and even 
constitutional interpretation. It applies to federal courts and 
state courts, trial courts and appellate courts. It applies to the 
Supreme Court of the United States and it applies to district 
courts. It applies to instances where courts rely on prior court 
decisions as well as instances where they rely on earlier 
statues or other sources. It even applies to legal policymaking 
in general, that is, not just to court decisions. In short, the 
critique applies very broadly. 
In a slightly different context, Adrian Vermeule writes, 
“The key point is not that judges are likely to get things wrong; 
it is that when they do get things wrong, they are likely to err 
in systematic rather than random ways.”84 Work from several 
academic disciplines shows that we humans possess a series of 
correlated biases that make us more likely to favor existing 
conditions, overestimate the costs of change, and 
underestimate the benefits of new social arrangements. If these 
phenomena motivate us, consciously or not, to overvalue what 
we already possess, then a legal system designed to rely almost 
exclusively on past decisions probably places too much 
emphasis on the past. The presence of correlated biases should 
be of great concern to legal scholars and policymakers. 
A. Choice Biases 
Hanson and Yosifon describe choice biases as those 
which “most clearly influence (and challenge economists’ 
typical assumptions regarding) people’s choices.”85 Recall that, 
according to the dominant view, stare decisis is defended 
because it leads to correct adjudication, stability, efficiency, 
and legitimacy. If lawyers’ and judges’ choices are shaped by 
these heuristics and biases, then decisions that we think foster 
these desirable goals may instead be reflecting the fact that we 
  
 83 Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 20. 
 84 Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism, supra note 23, at 1501. 
 85 Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 20, at 39. 
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are “cognitive misers”86 trying to avoid “the intolerable labor of 
thought.”87 
1. Cascades 
Stare decisis typically requires subsequent courts to 
follow the decisions of prior courts. The subsequent court, in its 
written decision, typically explains why it was correct that it 
follow the prior decision. But what if the later court’s reasoning 
was subconsciously skewed? What if the later court had reason 
to know the prior decision was probably inapplicable—but 
followed it anyway? As described below, the phenomenon 
known as “cascades” suggests that might be exactly what 
happens: subsequent decision-makers will follow a decision 
that was made at some earlier time, merely because it was 
popular—not because doing so is “correct” or “preferable” in 
any objective sense. 
Scholars generally distinguish between three different 
types of cascades: information cascades, reputational cascades, 
and availability cascades.88 As Kuran and Sunstein write, an 
informational cascade “occurs when people with incomplete 
personal information on a particular matter base their own 
beliefs on the apparent beliefs of others.”89 A reputational 
cascade is a similar case, in which “people take to speaking and 
acting as if they share, or at least do not reject, what they view 
as the dominant belief.”90 The combination of the two—when 
informational and reputational cascades “exhibit interactions 
and even feed on one another”—is known as an availability 
cascade.91 
The phenomenon of cascades—particularly information 
cascades—has relevance in law.  
A strictly informational cascade occurs when people start attaching 
credibility to a proposition P (e.g., a certain abandoned waste dump 
is dangerous) merely because other people seem to accept P. To 
recast an earlier illustration, suppose that Ames signals that he 
believes P. Barr, who would otherwise have major reservations, 
  
 86 Id. at 23. 
 87 HAND, supra note 1, at 241. 
 88 See, e.g., Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirschleifer & Ivo Welch, Learning 
from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, 12 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 151 (1998); Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 685. 
 89 Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 685-86. 
 90 Id. at 686-87. 
 91 Id. at 687. 
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believes P because Ames appears to do so. Cotton, who would have 
dismissed the proposition as silly, begins taking it seriously upon 
discovering that not just Ames but both he and Barr are believers. 
Noticing that Ames, Barr, and Cotton all seem alarmed, Douglas 
then accepts P without further thought. When Entin learns that all 
of his friends believe P, he joins the pack of believers on the grounds 
that their shared understanding cannot be wrong.92 
The problem, of course, is that everyone believed P merely 
because Ames did, even if, in some cases, they had information 
that would have led them to conclude otherwise! 
In a recent study, Salganik and his co-authors describe 
the results of a music downloads study.93 Participants in the 
study had the opportunity to download one of a range of songs. 
However, the authors introduced an element of social influence: 
participants could see what songs were being downloaded by 
others in a sort of “most popular songs” list. (The list, of course, 
could be manipulated.) In general, the best songs never did 
very badly, and the worst songs did not do particularly well. 
However, “almost any other result is possible.”94 When songs 
were on the list of popular songs, participants downloaded 
those songs. In other words, the mere signal of a song’s 
popularity increased the frequency of downloads—as 
participants received a “relatively weak” information signal.95 
The increased downloads created a sort of feedback loop, and 
those songs moved up on the list of popular songs. In making 
these seemingly independent decisions, participants were 
susceptible to significant social influence and demonstrated an 
information cascade. 
It is important to note that information cascades are not 
necessarily irrational. As Vermeule writes, an information 
cascade occurs when “individuals rationally allow[ed] the 
presumed information of others to swamp their private 
judgments.”96 If you have better information than I do, then it is 
  
 92 Id. at 721. The authors explain that reputational and availability cascades 
involve some element of social pressure. I do not dwell on those here, not because they 
are not relevant but, for simplicity’s sake, I assume that judges face no social or 
reputational pressures. Of course, this assumption may not be correct—but to the 
extent that the assumption does not hold, my argument is even stronger. 
 93 Matthew J. Salganik et al., Experimental Study of Inequality and 
Unpredictability in the Artificial Cultural Market, SCI. MAG., Feb. 10, 2006, at 854. 
 94 Id. at 855. 
 95 Id. at 854-55. 
 96 Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 28, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1087017) [hereinafter Vermeule, Many-Minds] (emphasis added). 
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quite rational for me to follow your decisions. The problem 
arises when I assume you have better information and you 
don’t. As I describe in the next Part, certain phenomena may 
alert us to the presence of a cascade. 
2. Status Quo Bias 
Information cascades are an external influence on 
individuals’ decision-making; the external cues of popular 
songs influence private choices about what to download. Status 
quo bias, on the other hand, is an internal influence on choice. 
It operates regardless of what is happening around us. 
Kahneman and his co-authors discuss status quo bias in 
their article on “anomalies”—psychological phenomena that are 
difficult to fit into the rational actor model, because 
“implausible assumptions are necessary to explain it within the 
paradigm.”97 Status quo bias is such an anomaly. In one 
experiment, individuals were asked to choose between several 
alternatives. In the “neutral” setting, they were simply asked 
to make a choice. In the “status quo” setting, one was the 
current arrangement, and they were asked to stick with the 
status quo option or choose an alternative. “Many different 
scenarios were investigated, all using the same basic 
experimental design. . . . The[] results implied that an 
alternative became significantly more popular when it was 
designated as the status quo. Also, the advantage of the status 
quo increases with the number of alternatives.”98 In another 
study, consumers were asked to choose among utility providers. 
Some respondents currently had very reliable utility service. 
Approximately sixty percent of those respondents expressed a 
“preference” for high-reliability service. Other respondents 
currently had unreliable utility service. Approximately sixty 
percent of those respondents expressed a preference for low-
reliability service. Among both groups, only about five percent 
were willing to switch to the other option.99 In both cases, 
individuals “demonstrated a pronounced status quo bias.”100 The 
remarkable point is that even those with unreliable service 
  
 97 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The 
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 193 (1991). 
 98 Id. at 198. 
 99 See id. 
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said they preferred it! The devil we know truly is more 
comforting—even when we know it is suboptimal. 
Kay, Jimenez, and Jost explain our preference for the 
actual and anticipated status quo through the twin examples of 
sour grapes and sweet lemons. They write that humans have a 
large capacity for rationalization, even in suboptimal 
situations. “It has been argued that people possess a 
‘psychological immune system’ that allows them to adjust to 
suboptimal outcomes by enhancing the subjective value of the 
status quo while devaluing alternatives to it.”101 The sour 
grapes/sweet lemons analogy helps explain how humans 
rationalize situations by bringing “preferences into line with 
expectations.”102 In the famous fable, the grapes are initially 
attractive. However, once the grapes become unattainable, they 
“become” sour. Of course, the character of the grapes has not 
changed at all; we merely rationalize the fact that we know we 
cannot get the grapes by making ourselves believe the grapes 
are sour. More interesting, however, is the “sweet lemons” 
phenomenon. In this situation, an initially less favored 
outcome (the lemon) becomes more favorable as the likelihood 
of such an outcome becomes greater—the lemons become 
sweeter if they are the more attainable.103 (This begins to cross 
over into system justification theory, which I discuss in Part 
III.B.1, infra.) 
Rationalization of the anticipated status quo 
demonstrates humans’ strong tendency to adapt to, and 
“prefer” the status quo. We justify events that are likely to 
happen, even those that initially seem unfavorable, just as we 
justify the already existing status quo. In other words, if we 
already have lemons, we are likely to justify our possession of 
lemons by believing they are sweet rather than try to get 
grapes which are more unattainable, and therefore we believe 
them to be sour. In Kay et al.’s study, survey respondents 
(prior to the 2000 election) were told that George W. Bush’s 
election was very likely based on certain polls. In light of this 
information, Republicans and Democrats increased their 
favorability rating of Governor Bush.104 The same result, in the 
  
 101 Aaron C. Kay, Maria C. Jimenez & John T. Jost, Sour Grapes, Sweet 
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SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1300, 1300 (2002). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 1309-10. 
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opposite direction, occurred when respondents were told that 
polls showed Vice President Gore likely to win.105 In short, we 
“accommodate, internalize, and even rationalize key features” 
of the status quo.106 When given a menu of options, we tend to 
choose the status quo, and when a given arrangement is about 
to become the status quo, we are remarkably adept at coming 
up with reasons why it is sweet and all others are sour.  
3. Endowment Effect 
One reason we may prefer the status quo is because we 
over-value it relative to other options. As Russell Korobkin 
explains, “The much studied ‘endowment effect’ stands for the 
princip[le] that people tend to value goods more when they own 
them than when they do not.”107 Jones and Brosnan define the 
endowment effect as “a psychological phenomenon that appears 
to underlie some seemingly irrational pricing of property and to 
thereby impede efficient exchange.”108 The endowment effect 
challenges the Coase Theorem, because the party holding a 
certain entitlement has an above-market willingness to accept 
price. When the other party is only willing to pay the market 
price, the entitlement will not change hands.109 This has legal 
implications because the Coase Theorem suggests that, among 
other things, (when transaction costs are low) parties will 
bargain around injunctions and other legal entitlements 
regardless of the initial allocation of those entitlements. 
However, given the endowment effect, the efficient outcome is 
not likely to occur.110  
In Knetsch’s oft-cited study, one group of students was 
offered a choice between a coffee mug and a chocolate bar as 
compensation for participating in the experiment. The second 
  
 105 See id. 
 106 John T. Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory, 25 POL. 
PSYCHOL. 881, 912 (2004).  
 107 Korobkin, supra note 25, at 1228. 
 108 Owen D. Jones & Sarah F. Brosnan, Law, Biology, and Property: A New 
Theory of the Endowment Effect, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1935, 1939 (2008). 
 109 Korobkin, supra note 25 at 1231. 
 110 See, e.g., Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After 
Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 421 (1999) (“A 
study of twenty old-fashioned nuisance cases litigated to judgment revealed no 
bargaining after judgment in any of them. Nor did any of the lawyers contacted believe 
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Khaneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment 
Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1345-46 (1990). 
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group was given a coffee mug initially, and then given the 
opportunity to trade it for a chocolate bar at the end of the 
experiment. The third group was given a chocolate bar at the 
beginning of the experiment, and then at the end was given the 
opportunity to trade it for a coffee mug. The results of the 
experiment showed that under the choice condition given to the 
first group, fifty-six percent of the students selected the mug. 
However, each of the other two groups exhibited a strong 
preference for what they already had: ninety percent of those 
given the mug refused to trade it for a chocolate bar while 
ninety percent of those given the chocolate bar refused to trade 
it for the mug. Each group “preferred” its initial endowment, 
even though, given a choice, preferences were about fifty-fifty.111  
It is worth noting that, for purposes of my analysis, it is 
not especially important why the endowment effect, or any of 
these phenomena, actually occur. Jones and Brosnan attempt 
to explore this question, and posit that the so-called “irrational” 
psychological phenomena may include some number “that once 
(and indeed long) were substantively rational, in the 
traditional economic sense,”112 but no longer are. However, this 
is not relevant to the first-level analysis. If humans exhibit 
certain tendencies that make them over-reliant on precedent, 
loosely defined, that finding has important implications for the 
law. Why the endowment effect occurs is relevant to the second-
level analysis, the “So what?” question. If we are concerned 
about these biases and want to use procedural or other 
methods to debias lawyers and judges, then it is helpful to 
know how and why these phenomena occur. However, their 
origins are not necessarily relevant to my overall argument 
that these phenomena undercut arguments for stare decisis. 
4. Framing Effect 
Earlier, I noted that the desirability of a policy option 
increases if it is described as the status quo. This is a version of 
the framing effect. Gonzalez et al. explain that 
the “framing effect” is observed when a decision maker’s risk 
tolerance (as implied by their choices) is dependent upon how a set of 
options is described. Specifically, people’s choices when faced with 
consequentially identical decision problems framed positively (in 
  
 111 Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible 
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terms of gains) versus negatively (in terms of losses) are often 
contradictory.113 
As a result, individuals prefer sure gains to risky gains and 
prefer risky losses to sure losses.114 
Kahneman and Tversky, who identified and named the 
phenomenon, describe the framing effect as “both pervasive 
and robust.”115 Moreover, it is “as common among sophisticated 
respondents as among naive ones.”116 This point is particularly 
relevant to the law. One easy way to dismiss the discussion of 
these phenomena is to posit that they manifest themselves in 
trivial settings like controlled studies involving chocolate bars. 
However, on closer inspection, that claim does not hold water. 
Kahneman and Tversky’s studies show that the framing effect 
affects sophisticated respondents. Moreover, as discussed 
above, people demonstrate a strong status quo bias even when 
they believe their responses will affect policy.117 The endowment 
effect is a barrier to post-judgment bargaining in real-life 
lawsuits, when individuals presumably have important 
interests at stake.118 Respondents report support for an 
undesirable status quo even when presented with the 
important—and divisive—issue of a presidential election. In 
sum, the facile response, “Sure, but that wouldn’t happen in 
real life when judges are faced with serious issues,” is not 
compelling. Indeed, as I show in Part IV.A.2, heuristic 
judgments are reflected even at the United States Supreme 
Court.  
5. Path Dependence 
Path dependence is another example of how individuals 
demonstrate an undue deference toward existing 
arrangements. Pierson explains that our current perception of 
political and economic outcomes is informed by the timing in 
which the initial political or economic decision was made. 
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Therefore, a seemingly minor decision gains significance as it is 
propagated over time and more people become accustomed to 
the consequences of that decision.119 Liebowitz and Margolis 
provide an example of path dependency using the concept of 
videotaping formats, Beta and VHS.120 They explain that an 
initial decision by consumers to use VHS, without previous 
knowledge as to which format provides better quality, might 
have much greater implications in the future if, based on this 
arbitrary decision, everyone continues to buy VHS for 
compatibility purposes. 
Liebowitz and Margolis define three different degrees of 
resulting path dependency. First degree path dependency 
explains that these initial decisions are made at random and 
thus efficiency models cannot predict which format will be 
chosen. With first degree path dependency, there is no 
inefficient outcome regardless of which option the public 
chooses, assuming that Beta and VHS provide similar quality. 
If over time it becomes apparent that Beta is the better option, 
then second degree path dependency occurs. In this scenario, 
choosing arbitrarily was rational given the initial conditions of 
limited knowledge as to which option was better. However, in 
retrospect (once we know that Beta is superior), the public 
realizes that the wrong decision was made initially. Third 
degree path dependency takes this one step further, assuming 
conditions where Beta was known to be superior from the start. 
If a small initial majority of consumers were to choose VHS, 
customers who prefer Beta—but have not yet made a 
decision—might choose VHS, unaware that others might also 
prefer Beta. If the present-day benefits of switching from VHS 
to Beta outweigh the costs, yet consumers remain hesitant to 
switch because they are unwilling to leave their current 
system, third degree path dependency occurs again.121  
Pierson explains that path dependence is significant 
because individuals become accustomed to current conditions, 
regardless of why and when they occurred. Thus, costs of 
switching increase over time, and the originally-arbitrary 
decision becomes lasting and substantial.122 Pierson relates this 
  
 119 Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of 
Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 251 (2000). 
 120 S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In and 
History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 208-09 (1995). 
 121 Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 120, at 208-09. 
 122 Pierson, supra note 119, at 252. 
90 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:1 
concept to increasing returns to scale, stating, “in an increasing 
returns process, the probability of further steps along the same 
path increases with each move down the path . . . . To put it a 
different way, the costs of exit—of switching to some previously 
plausible alternative—rise.”123 He then explains that “formal, 
change-resistant institutions” are especially susceptible to this 
process, since the cost and ambiguity associated with exit 
remain high. Pierson concludes that understanding path 
dependency provides “an important caution against a too easy 
conclusion of the inevitability, ‘naturalness,’ or functionality of 
observed outcomes,”124 cautioning us to consider that current 
institutions might not have been derived from an 
understanding of efficient conditions, but instead created based 
on conditions that are not only ancient but also initially 
arbitrary. As Mark Roe points out, path dependence means 
that “survival does not imply present-day superiority to untried 
alternatives.”125 
In her article on path dependence and stare decisis, 
Oona Hathaway distinguishes between increasing returns path 
dependence, evolutionary path dependence, and sequencing 
path dependence.126 The first category has its roots in the 
economics literature. Once a given decision is made, it is less 
costly to continue down that same path than to change to a 
different path. In this context, path dependence arises out of 
increasing returns.127 Evolutionary path dependence has its 
origins in the biological literature, in which the current genetic 
makeup of a species is constrained by its past evolutionary 
changes.128 Sequencing path dependence refers to the process by 
which the order in which choices are made affects the outcomes 
of those choices. In other words, if ten people need to make a 
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decision seriatim, each person’s individual decision could be 
affected by where he chooses in the lineup.129 
6. Sticky Defaults 
Relatedly, individuals are generally hesitant to deviate 
from current conditions because of the ease with which default 
rules get entrenched. On the Stickiness of Default Rules, by 
Ben-Shahar and Pottow, explores the factors prompting parties 
to continue using undesirable (but waivable) default rules in 
contract law, even when opting out of a legal default rule did 
not impose high costs or ambiguous outcomes on the parties.130 
The first reason they explain for this irrational phenomenon is 
that “in the presence of a familiar and commonly utilized 
background provision . . . a transactor might fear that 
proposing an opt-out from the default will dissuade his 
potential counterparty from entering into the agreement.”131 
The counterparty may view any opt-out from the default as a 
“trick,” used to cover up an unknown problem.132 Therefore, 
regardless of the practicality and efficiency of opting out of a 
default rule, a party might stick with the default rule since it 
attracts less suspicion and might hinder forming an agreement. 
This becomes especially apparent in areas where “it is 
uncommon for other market participants to negotiate a tailored 
provision, that is, where the background rules and templates 
are well entrenched and commonly employed.”133 
Ben-Shahar and Pottow further explain that the default 
rules might work in a similar manner to the concepts 
underlying the endowment effect. If a legal default is viewed as 
an entitlement, and added value is placed on a legal default 
because an individual already possesses or understands that 
default, then he will be less likely to opt out of the default. 
Based on Korobkin’s experiment investigating the endowment 
effect, Ben-Shahar and Pottow conclude that the “findings do, 
indeed, lend support to the conclusion that human beings are 
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cognitively disposed to prefer a default legal rule in contractual 
negotiations, irrespective of the content of that legal rule.”134  
Also stemming from Korobkin’s experiments on the 
endowment effect, Ben-Shahar and Pottow find that 
individuals prefer legal default rules because choosing an opt-
out option might leave individuals with a greater feeling of 
regret.135 Korobkin finds that individuals prefer options in 
which they do not have to take action to change the current 
situation. Even if individuals are not happy with a current 
situation, the perception that they will be worse off after 
changing the situation (whether or not that perception is 
correct) provides a powerful disincentive to change, since 
individuals might then regret their action.136 In this sense, 
regret is worse than accepting the current sub-optimal 
situation. Thus, Ben-Shahar and Pottow conclude “the 
attractive role of inaction in the service of ‘regret avoidance’ by 
decisionmakers”137 provides a powerful motive to stick with 
commonly-known default rules. 
B. Attitudes and Motives 
The rational actor model typically assumes that 
individuals have certain preferences, they think about those 
preferences, and then choose a certain course of action by 
exercising their will.138 The choice biases discussed above 
demonstrate that we do not “think” the way we think we think. 
The attitudes and motives discussed here demonstrate that we 
do not “prefer” the way we think we prefer. In other words, our 
reasoning is, among other things, motivated to justify existing 
social arrangements, to create coherent narratives for observed 
phenomena, and to simplify ambiguities. I discuss these in 
more detail below. 
1. System Justification Theory 
John Jost and his co-authors have developed the idea of 
system justification theory to explain why individuals support 
and “prefer” the existing system, even when doing so appears 
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to do more harm than good. Jost, Banaji and Nosek define the 
theory of system justification as “the process by which existing 
social arrangements are legitimized, even at the expense of 
[one’s] personal and group interest.”139 In several of Jost’s 
articles on the subject, he and his co-authors explain how 
system justification theory prompts individuals to value the 
system they currently have, especially when the system 
appears unlikely to change.140 System justification theory goes 
further than this, however, in that it motivates people not only 
to accept the current system, but to justify it. Jost and 
Hunyady explain, “System justification theory holds that 
people are motivated to justify and rationalize the way things 
are, so that existing social, economic, and political 
arrangements tend to be perceived as fair and legitimate.”141 In 
other words, people not only accept the status quo—they come 
up with reasons why it is right that the world is as it is. 
Jost and his colleagues give possible explanations as to 
why individuals practice system justification. For example, 
individuals may fear broad-based social change, preferring 
systems they know and understand.142 “For many people, the 
devil they know seems less threatening and more legitimate 
than the devil they don’t.”143 In cases where the system seems 
unlikely to change, individuals rationalize the system in order 
to convince themselves the system is fair, increasing 
“satisfaction with one’s situation.”144  
While system justification theory may lead individuals 
to self-report a relatively high level of satisfaction with the 
system, Jost explains that such reasoning actually hampers 
systems from evolving in a more fair and inclusive direction. 
For example, if individuals rationalize the status quo, they are 
unlikely to change it and may continue to justify an often 
unfair system without exploring new possibilities.145 Jost also 
describes the legal implications of system justification theories. 
For example, victims of abuse or discrimination might be 
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unlikely to bring attention to their cause if doing so would 
threaten the status quo. More generally, Jost explains that the 
system justification theory “identifies important obstacles to 
social change in general, as well as to change in law and legal 
scholarship. Law, lawyers, and legal scholars need to take 
seriously the research on system justification motives and 
processes.”146  
In a recent article, Blasi and Jost point out that the 
Supreme Court could point to only two instances in which it 
directly overturned an earlier precedent.147 They hypothesize 
that this could be in part because “cognitive dissonance, 
implicit biases, and system justification motives affect judges, 
just like the rest of us.”148 A broader version of this point is 
precisely the claim I make, and develop, in this Article.  
2. Motive to Simplify 
The motive to simplify and the motive to cohere provide 
another set of motivational factors prompting individuals to fall 
subject to a plethora of cognitive biases. Kunda explains that 
“we prefer those hypotheses that have greater simplicity, that 
is, require fewer additional hypotheses or assumptions to 
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account for the full range of evidence.”149 Hanson and Yosifon 
further note that we prefer simple social theories and 
explanations to more complicated versions because our minds 
“operate under scarce capacity, cognitively, temporally, and 
conceptually.”150 This motive to simplify, however, is often at 
odds with other motivations, such as the motive to be accurate, 
which requires more complex thought and explanation.151 This 
becomes problematic for individuals since “this conflict between 
the motive for simplicity and the motive for accuracy may spill 
over and cause discord for our motive of self-affirmation.”152 
3. Motive to Cohere 
The motive to cohere explains why we are not 
comfortable with conflicting sets of motives, such as the 
combination of the motive to simplify with the motive to be 
accurate. “Because we value coherence, the desire to see it in 
ourselves dovetails with our motive for self-affirmation.”153 
Thagard explains that individuals strive to make sense of 
themselves and the outside world, and attempt to do so by 
“fitting something puzzling into a coherent pattern of mental 
representations that include concepts, beliefs, goals and 
actions.”154 He further explains that “coherence can be 
understood in terms of maximal satisfaction of multiple 
constraints,” working together to form the most coherent story 
possible given the information available.155 Hanson and Yosifon 
explain that on an individual level, we seek to make our 
current situation cohere with our personal desires.156 In order to 
make our current situation more desirable, we compensate for 
a situation we dislike by physically gaining something (for 
example a monetary compensation), or else we alter our beliefs 
about that situation.157 Think here of the young associate who 
hates his BigLaw job but justifies keeping the job on the basis 
of his large paycheck.  
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On a group level, we seek coherence between our beliefs 
and the group’s beliefs, but this motive often stems from 
pluralistic ignorance. For example, in the “Princeton drinking 
study,” Prentice and Miller found that college student 
respondents mis-estimated their peers’ attitudes toward 
alcohol consumption.158 Then, in turn, they overestimated the 
gap between their peers’ drinking and their own; they assumed 
their peers were drinking more than they actually were.159 This 
is problematic when pluralistic ignorance influences behavior, 
prompting individuals to alter their perceptions (which might 
initially be correct) to fit what they misperceive are the 
perceptions of others in order to promote group coherence. 
Unfortunately, “[t]he problem of pluralistic ignorance and the 
motive for group coherence distorts many social norms and 
would seem to have significant implications for policy and 
law,”160 as many decisions in these areas are made based on 
inaccurate assumptions. 
C. Stare Decisis is Cognitive Error 
Stare decisis—reasoning from precedent—requires 
adhering to a prior decision because it is the prior decision, not 
necessarily because it is correct. Frederick Schauer has 
explained that reasoning from precedent is commonplace in all 
forms of argument, not just legal argument.161 When a younger 
child argues that he should be allowed to do something because 
his older sister was allowed to do so when she was the same 
age, the child is arguing based on precedent.162 He is essentially 
saying, “You should follow the same rule in this case that you 
followed in the prior case.”163 The youngster expects the prior 
rule to apply in his case, regardless of whether the rule was 
correct then or is correct now. 
However, taken together, the phenomena outlined above 
pose serious challenges to this mode of reasoning. First, the 
way we humans make choices strongly suggests that we are 
inclined to choose existing arrangements, not because they are 
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preferable but merely because they exist. Second, our brains 
are hard-wired in such a way that even the act of reasoning—
something that is at the heart of every judicial opinion—is 
skewed toward viewing the existing set of legal rules as just, 
right, and natural.  
In general, we (lawyers, judges, and citizens) are likely 
to overvalue existing legal entitlements because of the 
endowment effect. The Coase Theorem, which predicts that 
individuals will bargain around inefficient injunctions, turns 
out not to work in practice as it should in theory, in part 
because parties overvalue the injunction once it is in place.164 
Similarly, path dependence, the stickiness of default rules, and 
status quo bias suggest a cognitive predilection in favor of the 
way things are and have been. Thus, even judges with a good-
faith interest in being alert to the possibility of inefficient or 
otherwise undesirable precedents may fail to see that they are 
perpetuating, rather than mitigating, the rules’ effects.  
This is illustrated by the phenomenon of information 
cascades. Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein have made a version 
of my argument in their 2006 article, The Law of Other 
States.165 There, Posner and Sunstein develop a framework for 
analyzing when courts in one jurisdiction ought to treat as 
persuasive authority a rule laid down in a similar case in a 
foreign jurisdiction.166 They note that the Condorcet Jury 
Theorem typically suggests that if many other relevant 
decision-makers have reached a particular result, then this 
particular decision-maker has reason to believe, with a 
relatively high probability, that the outcome is the correct 
one.167 This rationale applies to courts’ decisions too; if several 
courts reach a particular outcome, we might be more confident 
in the correctness of their result. But this conclusion requires 
each iterative decision to be independent, a criterion that is 
violated when cascades are present.  
Earlier, I noted that the information cascade 
phenomenon is not irrational—a given judge, presuming that 
those who came before him had good information, has a high 
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level of confidence that they are correct and rationally follows 
their lead.168 However, as Vermeule points out, “[a] strategy 
that is individually rational for judges at any given time—
following custom or tradition or precedent—is harmful to all if 
followed by all, because it drains custom or tradition or 
precedent of any epistemic value.”169 At least to the 
Condorcetians and Burkeans, following tradition is more likely 
to lead to the correct answer. But if individuals are 
“withdrawing” from this bank of knowledge, but not 
contributing to it, then—by virtue of information cascades—we 
are all worse off. 
Such is also the case with status quo bias and the 
endowment effect. Typically, we assume that judges will 
independently evaluate a case and make a decision based on 
the merits. If a particular legal rule is outmoded or otherwise 
unworkable, we hope that they will at least say so, even if they 
ultimately conclude that they are bound by the existing 
precedent. But status quo bias and the endowment effect 
suggest this will not happen. When given a pre-existing set of 
legal rules, judges will be hesitant to move away from the 
status quo (status quo bias) and will overvalue the intrinsic 
worth of the existing rules (endowment effect). Because they 
overvalue the benefits of the current rule, they will 
correspondingly overestimate the costs of changing that rule.170 
This blends into the problem of sticky default rules. As 
Ben-Shahar and Pottow write in the context of contract law, 
parties tend to be unwilling to deviate from default rules for 
fear of being seen as manipulative or otherwise sneaky.171 
Similarly, a judge who deviates from the given rule might be 
seen as being “up to something,” or—quelle horreur!—an 
activist. Even if judges don’t have a sinister motive, the 
“stickiness” of default rules, in part because of the status quo 
bias, endowment effect, and so on, suggests that the judge will 
not deviate. Prentice and Koehler write about the “normality 
bias”—that actors are seen as more blameworthy when they 
take unusual actions than when they stick to the tried and 
true.172 As a result, judges have a strong incentive not to deviate 
  
 168 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 169 Vermeule, Many-Minds, supra note 96, at 22. 
 170 See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 82-83 (1982). 
 171 See supra notes 130-133 and accompanying text. 
 172 Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal 
Decision Making, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 583, 583 (2003). 
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from tradition, because they would be seen as more 
blameworthy if their novel rule proved unworkable. The 
problem is compounded by the fact that we humans prefer sub-
optimal situations to the risk of “getting it wrong” and the 
subsequent regret that might accompany choosing the non-
default option. Thus, even if judges did not have an ulterior 
motive, and even if they were not concerned about being 
“blamed” for deviating, they still might not depart from the 
pre-existing rule, because they misperceive the risk of change 
and the costs of regret. 
Framing effects and path dependence further entrench 
this problem. Recall that the framing effect suggests that the 
answer to a particular question often depends on how it is 
framed.173 Of particular importance and relevance here, the 
framing effect is robust even among sophisticated respondents 
and even when respondents believe their answers will have an 
effect on policy choices.174 And then, of course, as particular 
rules develop over time, path dependence suggests that they 
will get entrenched.175 Pierson explains that path dependence is 
particularly likely to occur in the context of “formal, change-
resistant institutions,” a description that certainly applies to 
the legal system.176 
A recent article by Lindquist and Cross underscores this 
point.177 The authors empirically tested the proposition that 
judges’ decisions reflect their policy preferences and are 
unconstrained by precedent.178 They found that precedent does 
in fact constrain judges’ decision-making—but only in cases 
that are not of first impression.179 In other words, once a 
decision is made in a case of first impression, that rule tends to 
stick.180 Stare decisis is defended on the ground that it controls 
judges’ caprice. But Lindquist and Cross’s study suggests that 
it simply entrenches a tremendous first mover advantage. 
  
 173 See supra Part III.A.4. 
 174 See Gonzalez et al., supra note 113, at 2; Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 
116, at 343. 
 175 See supra Part III.A.5. 
 176 Pierson, supra note 119, at 252. 
 177 Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s 
Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156 (2005). 
 178 Id. at 1158-59. 
 179 Id. at 1205-06. 
 180 Id. at 1183-84. I explore how a decision made in a case of first impression 
“sticks” in my discussion of Sarbanes-Oxley, infra Part IV.A.1. 
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Most noteworthy is that these biases often operate in 
tandem. Consider a legal question to which a reasonable person 
might answer X or Y. First-order path dependence teaches 
that, if both outcomes are roughly equally reasonable, there is 
no way to predict what a given court will do.181 However, if just 
one court chooses Y, information cascades suggest that (at least 
under certain circumstances), more and more people will start 
choosing Y. Over time, it might become apparent that X was 
the better option. But second-order path dependence predicts 
that we will be unlikely to choose X.182 This prediction is 
reinforced by status quo bias and the stickiness of default 
rules: given a particular legal entitlement (“Y”), we will be 
highly reluctant to move away from it.183 We might even 
imagine that some judges, in good faith, evaluate X and Y and 
weight the benefits of the correct rule against the costs of 
change. However, the endowment effect suggests that even 
these well-intentioned judges will overestimate the benefit of 
sticking with Y and overestimate, as a result, the cost of 
moving to X.  
Our choice biases also interact with our attitudes and 
motives. This is perhaps most vividly illustrated by the 
intersection of system justification theory and status quo bias: 
we start out predisposed to “preferring” the status quo, and 
once we get accustomed to the status quo, we imbue it with a 
sense of legitimacy. In this telling, we are even less likely to 
move from Y to X, because, in addition to the incorrect 
assessment of cost and benefit, we are subconsciously primed to 
believe that X—merely by virtue of being different—is unjust 
and unfair. Similarly, the motive to cohere and the motive to 
simplify predict that, when an array of fact patterns come up 
over time, judges are more likely to recast a given case in terms 
of pre-existing precedent (“Y”), because doing so is simpler and 
creates a coherent narrative. 
If these cognitive biases have explanatory power, then 
we might find ourselves in quite a bit of trouble. Under the 
current system, lower courts are supposed to take precedent at 
face value until altered. Moreover, stare decisis applies not 
only to courts’ holdings but also their ratios decidendi—the 
reasons for their decisions. But if judges (being, as they are, 
  
 181 See supra Part III.A.5. 
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 183 See supra Part III.A.6. 
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human) are using cognitive shortcuts, and if these shortcuts 
are all skewing in the same direction, then we should be 
suspicious of judges’ decisions and their stated reasons for 
them. 
About a decade ago, Eric Talley explored a partial 
version of my hypothesis: he analyzed whether legal doctrine 
could be explained as being the result of information cascades. 
In setting up this inquiry, he wrote, 
If common law precedent is in fact a type of [information] cascade, it 
would represent the strongest refutation yet of the common law 
efficiency hypothesis. Indeed, it would suggest that even if judges are 
predisposed towards efficiency, and even if they do not face a biased 
selection of cases, precedents might still frequently diverge from the 
most efficient legal rule. Moreover, a theory of precedential herding 
would force us to rethink the coherence of virtually any 
jurisprudential theory of precedent that conceives of the common law 
as a mechanism for judicial learning—be it economic or otherwise. If 
precedent represents a weak or impoverished learning device, then a 
common law system of adjudication seems unlikely to produce 
reliable results.184  
Thus far, the focus has been on courts’ use of stare 
decisis essentially as a heuristic, one that might be leading to 
suboptimal results, but in any event one whose epistemic basis 
has been called into question. But there is another sense in 
which adherence to precedent can be problematic. The 
psychological phenomena catalogued do not only suggest that 
stare decisis might be an unreliable guidepost for judicial 
decision-making. They also suggest that adherence to 
precedent may be serving as a “shield” for unjust or otherwise 
undesirable results. Consider that the normality bias suggests 
that decision-makers will be reluctant to deviate from the 
norm: even if precedent has entrenched a rule that is unfair to 
certain groups of people, a judge might feel that ruling against 
that group makes her complicit in this injustice. But stare 
decisis provides the necessary cover: “I’d like to help you, but 
I’m bound by precedent to rule against you.”185 As Hanson and 
  
 184 Talley, supra note 82, at 91 (emphasis added). Talley ultimately concludes 
that precedent cannot be fully explained by cascades, though he suggests that a more 
complete story (that explains precedent in terms of biases beyond just cascades) might 
be correct. See id. at 121-24. I respond to this point at the end of the Article. See infra 
notes 376-382 and accompanying text. 
 185 See, e.g., Westlake Vinyls v. Goodrich Corp., No. 5:03-CV-00240-R, 2007 
WL 1959168, at *3-4 (W.D. Ky. June 29, 2007) (“This court shares its sister district 
courts’ ‘latent misgivings’ about the propriety of the rule announced in Goodyear, but 
like those courts, is bound to apply governing Sixth Circuit precedent.”); United States 
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Benforado have noted, the actor-observer bias tends to make us 
blame the person when another person does something “bad” 
(what a rotten judge!) but to blame the situation when we do 
something bad (how could I be expected to defy precedent?).186 
And so our biases and attributional proclivities suggest not 
only that stare decisis might not be furthering the goals we 
think it is but also that the system itself may be providing 
“cover” to judges who render decisions they know may be 
perceived as unjust. 
Well, that’s the payoff. The correlated cognitive, 
psychological, and situational phenomena I have outlined in 
this Part, operating in tandem, strongly undercut the typical 
arguments for stare decisis. We think that the received legal 
rules are desirable (why would we have come to these decisions 
if they were not?). But “survival does not imply present-day 
superiority to untried alternatives.”187 In the balance of this 
Article, I evaluate what implications this might have for law, 
respond to some criticisms of my argument, and imagine what 
a (jurisprudential) world might look like if stare decisis did not 
have the weight it does today. 
IV. SOME PREDICTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND 
LEGAL THEORY 
A. Predicting Bias 
At this point, it is worth pausing and asking whether 
this theoretical argument has practical significance. Are there 
instances where reliance on stare decisis has produced 
“skewed” results? In one sense, the question is difficult to 
answer. For example, since Hadley v. Baxendale, a party who 
breaches a contract is only liable for reasonably foreseeable 
damages, not proximately caused damages.188 The practice of 
stare decisis has entrenched this rule in our system, and it may 
  
v. Pantoja, No. CR-05-164-FVS, 2006 WL 151939, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 19, 2006) 
(noting that a recent Supreme Court case arguably supported the defendant’s position, 
but that the district court was bound by Ninth Circuit precedent); Barclay v. Spitzer, 
371 F. Supp. 2d 273, 274-75 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting, in the context of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, that the New York State rule “seems more useful” than the 
federal rule, but explaining that Second Circuit precedent binds it to use the latter). 
 186 Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide: How 
Divergent Views of Human Behavior Are Shaping Legal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311, 322 
n.26 (2008). 
 187 Roe, supra note 125, at 644. 
 188 (1854) 9 Exch. 341, 342. 
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or may not be preferable to the alternatives. However, even 
among critics of Hadley’s rule,189 it would be hard to find some 
unanimity as to why Hadley was wrong, and harder still to 
determine if information cascades and status quo bias 
entrenched the rule, as opposed to a good faith belief among 
generations of judges that such a rule was preferable. 
However, it is possible to find at least circumstantial 
evidence of stare decisis producing results that are, if not 
skewed, at least somewhat suspect. Assume that a court at 
time t decides that, under certain circumstances, the correct 
legal rule is X. Assume further that at time t+n1, another court 
also holds X. Then, at t+n2, a third court holds X; at t+n3, a 
fourth court holds X. These courts might be reaching the same 
result because they believe the first rule was correct, or 
because doing so leads to stability, or to preserve judicial 
legitimacy. However, the entrenchment of the legal rule may 
also be due to heuristic judgments by the subsequent courts.  
There are several factors that could suggest that a 
subsequent court is following the first court’s holding because it 
is relying on stare decisis as a heuristic, rather than as a 
means to preserve certain ostensibly desirable goals. I predict 
that when the subsequent court’s decision reflects a heuristic 
judgment, the decision is likely to have one or more of several 
characteristics: 
1. The subsequent court relies on the first court, even 
though the first court’s decision is not binding on it. 
2. The subsequent court engages in relatively little 
legal analysis of the issue, whereas the first court engaged in 
extensive analysis. 
3. When there is ambiguity in the law, the subsequent 
court resolves the ambiguity in such a way that supports the 
decision of the first court. 
4. The subsequent court—when the number of cases 
following the first court is relatively high—justifies its decision 
with reference to the large number of courts that have already 
decided X. 
5. The subsequent court relies relatively more on policy 
considerations or generalized principles of law, rather than 
more detailed textual or doctrinal analysis. 
  
 189 See, e.g., Symposium, The Common Law of Contracts as a World Force in 
Two Ages of Revolution: A Conference Celebrating the 150th Anniversary of Hadley v. 
Baxendale, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 225 (2005). 
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When a rule of law is unsettled or still developing, I 
predict that several of these factors would be present in the 
decisions of the various subsequent courts, providing strong 
circumstantial evidence that the subsequent courts are using 
stare decisis as a crutch, rather than as a mode of legal 
reasoning that supports desirable outcomes. Of course, the list 
of factors is not exhaustive and the phenomenon is not limited 
to unsettled law. For example, when the rule of law has been 
settled for a relatively long period of time, the subsequent court 
might emphasize the destabilizing or disruptive impact that a 
deviation from the received rule would have.  
Although the list above is not intended to be exhaustive, 
the factors set out above are derived from the behavioral data 
catalogued in Part III. For example, in the music downloads 
study,190 songs were downloaded more often (the “subsequent 
court,” to use the construction above) when they were shown to 
be popular on a list of top downloads. If a similar phenomenon 
applied to judicial decision-making, I would predict that a 
certain rule of law would become more entrenched when it was 
shown to be the popular rule in other courts. Just as the 
Southern District of New York is not obligated to follow the 
rule of decision in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
someone downloading music in Lowenstein’s study was not 
obligated to download the popular song.191 Following a trend 
when it is not obligatory provides strong circumstantial 
evidence of information cascades. 
Along similar lines, system justification theory suggests 
that judicial decisions are entrenched because we want to 
believe that a legal system is fair and just. Subsequent courts 
might be inclined to follow earlier cases by telling the 
challenger that the status quo rule (made by the first court) is 
the fairer and more just rule. Similarly, our motives to simplify 
and cohere suggest that courts will be hostile to those who 
challenge the precedential rule, because change is potentially 
disruptive. Particularly in the face of ambiguity, these 
phenomena suggest that our reasoning is motivated to create 
simple and coherent narratives out of the facts before us, which 
in turn suggests that courts will resolve ambiguity in favor of 
the precedential rule. Risk aversion—and the tendency of 
  
 190 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. 
 191 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. 
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courts (and others) to overestimate the costs of change—further 
escalates this problem.  
According to the case law, lower courts are obligated to 
accept binding precedent at face value until altered. But the 
cognitive and situational phenomena canvassed above suggest 
that we humans will generally rely on “precedent”—that is, we 
will defer to, and overvalue, existing rules and arrangements—
regardless of the doctrinal edicts that compel a judge to do so in 
a particular case. Courts will rely on precedent, even when 
they are not obligated to, as a cognitive shortcut, pushing the 
law in directions that might be incorrect or otherwise socially 
undesirable. 
1. Testing the Prediction I: Section 304 of Sarbanes-
Oxley 
In 2002, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
response to the corporate scandals of the day.192 Among other 
things, the law provided for so-called “clawbacks.” Under this 
provision, in section 304 of the law,193 a company would be able 
to recover certain compensation paid to its executives if 
malfeasance was later revealed.194 Specifically, the law provided 
that if an issuer filed a restatement because of misconduct 
resulting in “material noncompliance” with financial reporting 
requirements, then the company’s CEO and CFO would be 
required to reimburse the issuer for (1) bonuses and other 
compensation received in the twelve months following the first 
filing of financials subject to a restatement; and (2) any profits 
derived from the sale of the issuer’s securities during those 
twelve months.195 
However, section 304 did not specify who had the right 
to enforce the provision. Some sections explicitly gave a 
company’s shareholders the right to enforce the statutory 
provision in question;196 other sections explicitly reserved 
enforcement authority in the Securities and Exchange 
  
 192 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, and 28 U.S.C.). 
 193 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006). 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 306, 15 U.S.C. § 7244 (explicitly affording a 
private right of action in the insider trading context). 
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Commission.197 Section 304 did neither. It was a classic “gray 
area.” Predictably, in the years since SOX was enacted, section 
304 has been the subject of many shareholder derivative suits. 
The shareholder plaintiffs have argued that section 304 creates 
an implied private right of action in their favor, and the 
companies have argued that it does not.198 
Eventually, the courts spoke on the question.199 The first 
case to squarely address this issue was Neer v. Pelino, a 2005 
case from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.200 Neer 
recognized that when a statute is unclear as to whether there 
is a private right of action, courts must conduct a four-step 
analysis, as the Supreme Court instructed in Cort v. Ash.201 
Therefore, Neer analyzed the four “Cort factors” to determine 
whether there was a private right of action under section 304. 
The court examined the statutory text of section 304, the 
legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley, and the relation of 
section 304 to other provisions in the statute.202 Neer ultimately 
concluded that there was no private right of action under 
section 304 and dismissed that count of plaintiffs’ complaint for 
failure to state a claim.203 
So far, so good. But statutory analysis, it turns out, has 
a lot in common with music downloads. Recall that in the study 
by Salganik et al., songs would get downloaded more often if 
the consumers were told that those songs were popular.204 
  
 197 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 303, 15 U.S.C. § 7242 (explicitly giving the 
SEC exclusive enforcement authority). 
 198 These were the litigants’ positions in all of the cases cited in this Part. 
 199 My case study focuses on the district courts to address this question. As of 
this date, only one circuit court has squarely addressed the issue. See In re Digimarc 
Corp. Derivative Litig., 549 F.3d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]here is no private right 
of action under section 304.”). Another case addresses the issue, but does so briefly 
with little discussion. See Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. 
Raines, 534 F.3d 779, 793 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that section 304 “does not create a 
private right of action”). I discuss the district court’s ruling in Digimarc in this Part. 
However, for my purposes, it is not particularly relevant that the Ninth Circuit has 
spoken to this issue. My overall thesis explores the development of this line of case law 
at the district courts and, for the three-plus years between Neer and the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision, Neer was the first district court case. In fact, Neer has not been cited and 
Digimarc has been cited only three times in a reported case in the ten months since 
Digimarc, suggesting that the issue is sufficiently resolved at this point as to not 
necessitate further litigation. This underscores how the phenomena catalogued here 
can be problematic for the development of the law, even when the pattern develops 
only among district courts. 
 200 389 F. Supp. 2d 648 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
 201 Id. at 652-53; see also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
 202 389 F. Supp. at 653-57. 
 203 Id. at 657-58. 
 204 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. 
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Information cascades are well-documented in other contexts. 
What about in the law? The section 304 example shows federal 
district courts across the country essentially following the rule 
set forth in Neer, with little to no legal analysis of their own. 
Over time, the Neer rule has become reinforced in the case law, 
with subsequent courts referring to the large number of prior 
courts that have reached the same conclusion as Neer. The 
courts are following the leader, even though Neer is binding on 
none of these courts. Although the subsequent cases tend to 
recognize the statutory ambiguity, they uniformly resolve the 
ambiguity in a way that supports Neer. As a result, every 
subsequent case meets characteristics (1) and (3) above. I 
discuss the post-Neer cases below. 
Neer’s analysis spanned seven pages in the official 
reporter.205 Since Neer, cases have resolved the issue in just a 
few paragraphs, or sometimes just a sentence or two. The next 
major case after Neer, In re BISYS Group, Inc. Derivative 
Action, disposed of the issue in just two paragraphs with no 
substantive legal analysis.206 Instead, the court summarily held: 
[T]here is no private right of action under Section 304 of Sarbanes-
Oxley, substantially for the reasons stated in Neer. The question 
whether creation of a private right of action under Section 304 might 
have been a good idea is for Congress, which alone is charged with 
making the close judgments and sometimes messy compromises 
inherent in the legislative process.207 
Thus, BISYS reflects factors (2) and (5) above: relatively little 
legal analysis of the issue, and a reliance on policy 
justifications in lieu of textual or doctrinal analysis.208  
In In re Whitehall Jewellers, Inc. Shareholder Derivative 
Litigation, the court laid out the Cort factors and discussed the 
  
 205 Neer, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 651-57. 
 206 In re BISYS Group, Inc. Derivative Action, 396 F. Supp. 2d 463, 464 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 207 Id. at 464. 
 208 The court’s comment that the issue is one for Congress is peculiar, because 
the Supreme Court has indicated that courts may imply private rights of action under 
certain circumstances. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). Judge Kaplan might 
(correctly) believe that the current Court disfavors implied rights of action and that he 
should therefore disregard Cort. However, “[i]f a precedent of [the Supreme] Court has 
direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of 
decisions, the [lower court] should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to 
[the Supreme] Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson, 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (emphasis added). 
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issue more extensively than in BISYS.209 However, Whitehall 
also demonstrates the beginnings of an information cascade 
regarding section 304. First, the court wrote that it “is inclined 
to concur with its colleagues in Neer and Bisys Group that no 
private right of action is available under § 304 . . . .”210 Second, 
although the court laid out the applicable doctrinal analysis, at 
every juncture, it simply deferred to Neer or BISYS.211 
Whitehall thus reflects at least factor (2), and to a lesser extent 
(4)—reference to the number of courts that have already 
reached a particular decision.212  
Kogan v. Robinson, about eight months after Neer, 
engaged in the most extensive analysis of any post-Neer case.213 
However, even here, the legal analysis relies on Neer at every 
turn.214 Additionally, the court refers to the fact that “all other 
courts that have considered this issue[] . . . conclude[d] [that] 
Section 304 does not explicitly create a private remedy.”215 And 
when plaintiffs cited a Ninth Circuit case implying a right of 
action in favor of shareholders, the court declined to follow it, 
in part on policy grounds.216 Kogan noted that courts were more 
likely to imply rights of action in the past.217 Because implied 
rights of action are disfavored today, Kogan found the earlier 
Ninth Circuit case distinguishable.218 Thus, despite its 
relatively extensive analysis, Kogan reflects factors (4) and (5). 
The result was the same in In re Digimarc Corp. 
Derivative Litigation.219 The court noted plaintiffs’ argument 
“that Section 304’s text, [SOX’s] statutory construction and 
legislative history, and the purpose underlying Section 304 all 
favor finding the existence of an implied private right of 
  
 209 In re Whitehall Jewellers, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 05 C 1050, 
2006 WL 468012, at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2006). 
 210 Id. at *8. 
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action.”220 The court responded with little legal analysis, writing 
instead, “Every court that has considered the issue directly has 
concluded that Section 304 contains no implied private right of 
action.”221 Digimarc reflects factors (2) and (4). 
The court in In re Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 
Derivative Litigation disposed of the section 304 issue in just 
two paragraphs.222 Like its predecessors, the court relied on 
Neer: “The Court is persuaded by the well-reasoned decision in 
Neer v. Pelino.”223 Goodyear acknowledged that there was no 
binding precedent on the issue.224 Therefore, it concluded, “this 
Court is free to consider [Neer, Whitehall, Kogan, and 
Digimarc] as persuasive authority on which it bases its 
decision.”225 Of course, one might think that, “[i]n the absence of 
binding authority,”226 it is more important for a district court to 
analyze the legal claims anew, if only to provide a fuller 
presentation of the legal issues for appeal. The court’s failure to 
engage in such analysis underscores factor (1), and also reflects 
factors (2) and (4). 
In Pedroli ex rel. Microtune Inc. v. Bartek, the court 
declined to imply a private right of action, pointing out that the 
plaintiff was “ignoring the predominant holdings across the 
country that the Act does not create a private cause of action 
under § 304 . . . .”227 The court disposed of the issue in just two 
paragraphs, concluding, “The court declines to address the 
issue in any more detail and believes that the cases cited 
conclusively mandate a dismissal of [the section 304] 
Count . . . .”228 Pedroli also demonstrates numbers (2) and (4). 
In re Infosonics Corp. Derivative Litigation reflects 
factor (2) and especially (3).229 First, the court deferred to Neer 
and Kogan, addressing the issue in just two paragraphs.230 
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Tex. 2008) (citing Neer, BISYS, Kogan, Whitehall, and Digimarc). 
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Second, it noted that Congress could have been explicit about 
creating a private right, just as it was in section 306.231 Of 
course, it is just as true that if Congress wanted to foreclose a 
private right, it could have done so explicitly, just as it did in 
section 303.232 The court thus resolved the statute’s ambiguity 
in favor of the earlier, non-binding cases.233 This underscores 
factor (3). 
The In re Diebold Derivative Litigation case disposed of 
the section 304 claim in just one paragraph, with no legal 
reasoning at all, writing: 
Every court that has considered whether SOX § 304 provides a 
private right of action has answered that question in the negative 
[citing Neer, BISYS, Kogan, and Goodyear]. Th[is] [c]ourt agrees, 
and finds that SOX § 304 does not create an implied private right of 
action.234 
Unsurprisingly, Diebold reflects factors (2) and (4) above. 
However, it is interesting to note that Diebold, decided in 2008, 
gave no special weight to Goodyear, decided in 2007 by the 
same court. In theory, horizontal stare decisis requires a court 
to adhere to its prior decisions.235 Therefore, Diebold could have 
disposed of the issue by writing, “Until and unless the Sixth 
Circuit instructs otherwise, this court is obligated to follow its 
prior decisions. Accordingly, there is no private right of action 
under section 304, as stated in Goodyear.” The fact that 
Diebold gives no special weight to Goodyear (mentioning it only 
at the end of a string-cite)236 gives additional support for the 
conclusion that Diebold’s conclusion is based on a heuristic 
judgment, rather than bona fide legal analysis. 
The court in In re iBasis, Inc. Derivative Litigation 
recognized the tension between sections 303, 304, and 306.237 
But that court also deferred to “all other courts that have had 
the occasion to address the issue directly” and “found that 
Congress did not create a private right of action for purposes of 
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 232 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 303, 15 U.S.C. § 7242 (2006). 
 233 In re Infosonics, 2007 WL 2572276, at *9. 
 234 In re Diebold Derivative Litig., Nos. 5:06CV0233, 5:06CV0418, 2008 WL 
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 235 See, e.g., Nash & Pardo, supra note 19, at 1750-51. 
 236 In re Diebold, 2008 WL 564834, at *2. 
 237 In re iBasis, Inc. Derivative Litig., 532 F. Supp. 2d 214, 224 (D. Mass. 2007). 
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enforcing section 304 of SOX.”238 The court went on to cite 
Goodyear, Digimarc, Kogan, Whitehall, BISYS, and Neer and 
was “persuaded by . . . precedent from other courts that have 
directly and thoughtfully considered the issue.”239 
The iBasis decision is interesting on two levels. First, it 
reflects factors (2) and (4). However, it goes further. iBasis not 
only cites the cases above but also credits the “direct[] and 
thoughtful[] consideration” those cases gave to “the issue” of 
whether SOX § 304 contains an implied private right of 
action.240 This reference is striking because, as discussed above, 
almost none of the cited cases engage in “direct[] and 
thoughtful[] consideration”241 of the issue. Instead, most of the 
cases discuss the issue briefly, with little or no legal analysis, 
deferring almost categorically to Neer. 
At this point, it is worth reiterating Posner and 
Sunstein’s argument: 
If two states have adopted a law, or if two state courts have made 
some innovation, a third may do so, not because of any kind of 
independent judgment, but because it is following its predecessors. 
And if three states have made the same decision, a cascade might be 
forming. The problem is that subsequent states might assume that 
decisions have been made independently, even though most have 
been following the crowd.242 
The cases discussed in the section 304 example 
demonstrate, to varying degrees, all of the features that I 
predict would be present when later courts are following an 
earlier court out of cognitive bias. The case study provides 
strong support for the hypothesis that, at least sometimes, 
courts defer to prior decisions because doing so is quick and 
easy—not because doing so leads to the best results.243 
  
 238 Id. 
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 242 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 165, at 32. 
 243 Two interesting questions arise. First, would every single case have come 
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derivative suits. See Chen & Hanson, supra note 27, at 59-64. 
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2. Testing the Prediction II: The First and Fourth 
Amendments 
In one sense, heuristic judgments should be less 
common at the Supreme Court. The court has the luxury of 
deciding which cases it will hear, so it can manage its resources 
in a way that other courts cannot. If heuristics are a way of 
dealing with scarce cognitive (judicial) resources, then we 
should expect to find such biases less prevalent when resources 
are greater. Similarly, Supreme Court Justices (and law clerks) 
may, aware of the importance of their work, be especially 
careful not to take shortcuts, cognitive or otherwise. 
But at the same time, other considerations suggest that 
the Supreme Court might be more prone to biases and 
heuristics. First, the Court is final; it is bound by no other 
court, as reflected in Justice Jackson’s famous quote, “We are 
not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only 
because we are final.”244 A lower court might rationalize its 
reliance on precedent on the basis of the doctrinal rules that 
obligate it to reach a particular result. The Supreme Court, 
answerable (at least formally) to no institution but itself, might 
actually be more susceptible to bias because it is not bound by 
any sort of frequent check. 
Second, as Richard Posner points out, at least in 
constitutional cases, the Supreme Court is not bound by any 
“law” at all. Posner writes, 
The Supreme Court, when it is deciding constitutional cases, is 
political in the sense of having and exercising discretionary power as 
capacious as a legislature’s. It cannot abdicate that power, for there 
is nothing on which to draw to decide constitutional cases of any 
novelty other than discretionary judgment. To such cases the 
constitutional text and history, and the pronouncements in past 
opinions, do not speak clearly. Such cases occupy a broad open area 
where the conventional legal materials of decision run out and the 
Justices, deprived of those crutches, have to make a discretionary 
call.  
Constitutional cases in the open area are aptly regarded as 
“political” because the Constitution is about politics and because 
cases in the open area are not susceptible of confident evaluation on 
the basis of professional legal norms. They can be decided only on 
  
 244 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
2009] STARE DECISIS IS COGNITIVE ERROR 113 
the basis of a political judgment, and a political judgment cannot be 
called right or wrong by reference to legal norms.245 
My assertion here is not that the Supreme Court’s 
position of finality renders it incapable of making “bias-free” 
judgments. I am making a different point: although the Court’s 
position situates it different from the lower courts, it is still 
susceptible to heuristics and biases. 
The evolution of three lines of Supreme Court 
precedent, in the context of the First and Fourth Amendments, 
demonstrates such judgments. In a recent series of articles, 
Anuj Desai explains how certain First and Fourth Amendment 
constitutional doctrines can only be properly understood with 
the statutory history of the United States Postal Service in 
mind. When early Post Office cases came to the Court, they 
were properly decided with reference to the statutes that 
Congress had enacted governing the Post Office. However, 
those cases implicated broader policy issues regarding free 
expression and privacy. Later, when constitutional questions 
implicating free expression and privacy arose, the Supreme 
Court followed its earlier Post Office decisions—even though 
those decisions were based on the unique institutional context 
of the Post Office and were not squarely on all fours with the 
constitutional cases. The Constitution makes no mention of a 
First Amendment “right to receive” ideas,246 and it does not 
restrict government subsidies in connections with the mail.247 
And the Fourth Amendment does not specify that 
correspondence between persons is subject to a right to 
privacy.248 Yet these (judge-made) doctrines exist today—and 
they all have their origins in Post Office policy. 
Professor Desai outlines the process by which 
constitutional law can follow legislative choices thusly: “(1) 
Congress passes a statute; (2) the statutory provision gives an 
institution certain attributes; (3) over time, social practice 
embeds those attributes into the institution; and (4) the courts 
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then take those attributes and write them into constitutional 
law.”249 
Desai chronicles how this process manifested itself in 
connection with the Post Office. First, the legislature embedded 
certain republican principles (a right to privacy in the mails, a 
right to receive ideas) into the institution.250 Over the years, 
these principles became ingrained into societal expectations 
about how the Post Office should operate. Eventually, the 
Supreme Court held that these principles were constitutionally 
required.251 The Supreme Court effectively raised Post Office 
statutes to the level of Constitutional law. 
This kind of evolution supports my thesis. The Supreme 
Court elevates Post Office policy to constitutional law, not 
because of some strong consensus that the Post Office statute 
from 1792 reflects our understanding of the Fourth 
Amendment, but because it is following precedent, trying to 
minimize doctrinal conflicts, and relying on case law even 
though it arose in a distinct context. The Court’s reliance on 
stare decisis is, at least in part, the reflection of heuristics and 
biases. Over the next several pages, I summarize two of Desai’s 
articles, showing how this evolution took place. I then explain 
in some more detail how this story supports my thesis. 
This story starts in the 1770s, when revolution was 
brewing in the colonies. The existing British postal system had 
no notion of privacy of correspondence. Indeed, the British 
government regularly opened citizens’ mail in order to gather 
intelligence on “conspiracies.”252 Though it was officially illegal 
to open mail without a warrant, warrants were issued secretly 
and could often contain hundreds of names.253 As one historian 
stated, “secrecy made legality unimportant.”254 
Not only was confidentiality of the mail compromised, 
those who controlled the postal networks could also control 
what was allowed through the networks. Postmasters would 
exploit their position to block competing newspaper publishers 
from using the postal service.255 As tensions rose between the 
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British and the colonists, the nature of this blocking became 
political.256 
This regular opening of private correspondence posed a 
special problem for American rebels, who had to ensure privacy 
of correspondence to carry on their plans for the Revolution. 
Further, their inability to use the postal service to distribute 
their newspapers discouraged the American rebels from 
communicating their ideas to a larger audience. In response, 
they adopted an alternate mail system, the “constitutional 
post,” established by William Goddard, a Philadelphia 
newspaperman.257 Goddard realized the importance of the 
postal network for securely transmitting private information as 
well as for transmitting news and ideas to the populace. In his 
proposal to establish the “constitutional post,” he wrote, “It is 
not only our letters that are liable to be stopped and opened by 
a ministerial mandate, and their contents construed into 
treasonable conspiracies, but our newspapers, those necessary 
and important alarms in time of publick danger, may be 
rendered of little consequence for want of circulation.”258 His 
goals coincided with those of the American revolutionaries—
freedom to express ideas without fear of being accused of 
treason.259 
In 1782, the Continental Congress passed a postal 
ordinance that codified this desire for freedom of 
correspondence.260 The ordinance prohibited postal officials from 
opening the mail without “an express warrant.”261 The 
ordinance also called for “moderate rates” for the mailing of 
newspapers.262 After the ratification of the Constitution, 
Congress passed the Post Office Act of 1792.263 The Act 
contained a similar provision for privacy of correspondence, 
which passed without controversy or even much discussion.264 
However, debate arose around two issues involving 
newspapers. One issue revolved around whether to allow all 
newspapers to be circulated or whether to selectively admit 
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certain newspapers.265 The second issue was what rate should 
be charged for mailing newspapers.266 Eventually, Congress 
voted against selective admission, based on fears that the 
policy would be used by the postmasters to discriminate 
against publications they disagreed with.267 As for rates, the 
legislature decided on reduced rates for newspaper subscribers, 
mostly subsidized by letter writers.268 This newspaper subsidy 
was based on the idea that in a republic, it was the 
government’s responsibility to ensure citizens have access to 
information about public affairs.269 The passage of this Act set 
in motion important policies that would shape the Post Office 
as an institution, and eventually shape constitutional law.270 
Another consequence of the 1792 Post Office Act was the 
formation of a functional monopoly of the Post Office.271 This 
happened because Congress chose to retain the power to 
designate postal routes.272 This power gave representatives a 
chance to bring back tangible benefits to their district in the 
form of a Post Office and mail service—what we might today 
call congressional “pork.” Naturally, this led to the rapid 
proliferation of postal routes, even to areas with very small 
populations. This ubiquity of mail routes made the Post Office 
the most effective conveyor of information across long 
distances, leading to a “practical dependence of the public upon 
the [P]ost [O]ffice,” as Justice Holmes would later state.273 This 
effective monopoly had later implications for constitutional 
law.274 
Desai emphasizes that privacy of correspondence and 
subsidized rates for newspapers both developed independently 
of the Constitution.275 These republican principles had already 
been written into the 1782 Postal Ordinance, and the 
Constitution was ratified in 1789. Thus, the principles of 
privacy of correspondence and newspaper subsidies pre-dated 
the Constitution. 
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How then did this minor postal act find its way into 
constitutional law? Tracking Desai, I address each principle 
separately—the Fourth Amendment principle of privacy of 
correspondence, First Amendment restrictions on government 
subsidies, and the First Amendment “right to receive” ideas. 
Privacy of correspondence was first addressed in Ex 
Parte Jackson.276 Though the case is primarily seen today 
through the lens of its First Amendment implications, Desai 
points out that this is the first case in which the Court 
acknowledged a right to privacy of correspondence.277 The fact 
pattern of the case had nothing to do with the opening of sealed 
letters—the petitioner, Orlando Jackson, had been convicted 
for mailing information about a lottery.278 The case mainly 
revolved around whether the government had the right to 
prevent certain materials deemed “unmailable” from being 
mailed.279 The Court eventually upheld the statute and 
Jackson’s conviction.280 However, the majority added in dictum 
that it could not enforce the statute by opening sealed letters.281 
It is this dictum that first addresses the issue of privacy of 
correspondence: “[A] distinction is to be made . . . between what 
is intended to be kept free from inspection, such as letters, and 
sealed packages subject to letter postage; and what is open to 
inspection, such as newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and 
other printed matter, purposely left in a condition to be 
examined.”282 
The Court further stated, “The constitutional guaranty 
of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against 
unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, 
thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be.”283 Desai 
claims that the Court “effectively characterized a letter passing 
through the mail system as the sender’s ‘papers’ for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.”284 The principle of privacy of mail 
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correspondence was thus constitutionalized. “Justice Field saw 
in the Fourth Amendment not what the constitutional drafters 
had put there, but instead what postal policymakers had 
incorporated into the structure of the Post Office.”285 This 
judicial interpretation based on the Post Office is an example of 
path dependence and risk aversion—the traditions of an 
institution becoming reinforced over time because people prefer 
the less risky path of status quo. This principle of privacy of 
correspondence as applied to mail was simply announced as a 
self-evident truth, even though no mention of it had appeared 
in the Constitution, and even though the notion itself was new 
in the 18th century. 
Milwaukee Leader286 and Hannegan v. Esquire287 provide 
examples of how the Supreme Court made postal subsidies for 
newspapers a matter of constitutional law.288 The Milwaukee 
Leader case involved a Socialist newspaper that was denied 
subsidized mailing rates, because it was deemed 
“nonmailable.”289 The Court held that the newspaper could be 
denied the subsidized rate.290 In his dissent, Justice Brandeis 
characterized the denial of the subsidy as akin to a “penalty” or 
“fine.”291 He further stated that such discrimination was 
“effective censorship.”292 Desai points out that Brandeis’s 
reasoning was closely entwined with particular attributes 
about the Post Office itself.293 Specifically, the monopoly that 
the Post Office held over long distance communication, and the 
subsidies provided to other publications, would likely cause the 
newspaper to lose money and fold.294 Brandeis’s reasoning is 
dependent on this institutional context—and tends to reflect 
the operation of some of the cognitive biases described above. 
For example, it is not necessarily the case that denying a 
subsidy to this newspaper is effective censorship; it might be 
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distributed through means other than the Post Office. 
Brandeis’s reliance on the institutional characteristics to make 
a broader point, unrelated to the institution, reflect a motive to 
simplify. 
Hannegan v. Esquire focused on a similar question: 
whether the Postmaster General had the power to determine 
what was eligible for subsidized second-class mailing rates.295 In 
this case, the Postmaster had determined that Esquire 
magazine was not entitled to second class rates because it was 
deemed sexually explicit.296 This time, the Court ruled that the 
Postmaster did not have the power to decide which publications 
were eligible for subsidized mailings.297 The Court stated that to 
give the Postmaster that power would amount to censorship, 
and to give a government official the power to decide “[w]hat is 
good literature, what has educational value, what is refined 
public information, [or] what is good art . . . smacks of an 
ideology foreign to our system.”298 Desai points out that such an 
assertion, taken out of the context of the Post Office, is simply 
wrong.299 For example, public university professors and public 
school teachers are hired specifically for the purpose of deciding 
what is good literature or has educational value.300 Again, the 
Court relies on the institutional context of the Post Office to 
explain its reasoning, even though its conclusions are not 
related to the Post Office.301  
It is interesting to think about what the court might 
decide if Congress had decided not to subsidize newspapers, or 
to charge newspapers according to the distance the paper 
traveled. Would the issue then become one of whether 
subscribers living too far away are being denied their free 
speech rights? The point, of course, is not that these decisions 
were substantively incorrect; instead, it is that this reasoning 
reveals a tendency to use existing non-binding rules to justify 
subsequent decisions. The notion that newspapers had a right 
to subsidized postage was not mentioned in the Constitution. 
Yet somewhere along the line it became a conventional truth. 
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The Court even referred to “our traditions” of providing 
newspaper subsidies.302 
The Post Office’s monopoly over long distance 
communication makes its way into Lamont v. Postmaster 
General.303 By the 1920s, the Post Office’s monopoly over long 
distance communication was such an entrenched reality that 
the reasoning of the case was shaped around that fact.304 
Though the Court did not allude much to the Post Office, one 
can see their dependence on that specific institution by looking 
at how the Court dealt with the “right to receive” in a different 
case, Board of Education v. Pico.305 In that case, the attempt to 
apply the “right to receive” to books in a public school library 
did not succeed.306 The analogy failed because most of the 
Justices felt the institutional differences between the Post 
Office and public schools were too great.307 The notion that the 
Post Office constituted a monopoly played a large part in the 
development of the “right to receive” doctrine. According to 
then-Justice Rehnquist, if a person could not receive materials 
through the mail, it was the equivalent of a “complete denial of 
access to the ideas sought,”308 because the Post Office 
constituted an effective monopoly. Desai points out that 
Rehnquist makes an overstatement—a person could indeed 
receive ideas through other avenues (something that is 
probably even more true today).309 Rehnquist’s reasoning 
reveals a motive to simplify, a preference for the simpler of two 
explanations. The inability to receive materials in the mail only 
constituted a “complete denial” in the context of the 
monopolistic Post Office. For example, if the Post Office Act of 
1792 had instead ceded power to the Executive to designate 
postal routes, and as a result our postal service had been much 
smaller, the “right to receive” may very well not have 
developed, at least in the context of receiving mail. Thus, the 
reasoning behind the “right to receive” cannot be divorced from 
its institutional underpinnings. 
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So what is happening here? How do ideas that were 
novel in the eighteenth century, having nothing to do with 
constitutional law, become a matter of constitutional law in the 
twentieth? Let us return to the late eighteenth century, when 
the new American republicans had recently escaped the 
clutches of British rule. A framing effect may have affected 
their decision-making when it came to Post Office policy. Recall 
that a framing effect is observed when a decision maker’s 
choices are affected by the way those choices are described.310 
Faced with a decision to either allow all newspapers to be 
published or only some newspapers to be published, the 
decision makers chose to allow all newspapers to be published. 
Each decision was viable—proponents of selective admission 
argued that newspapers overburdened the mail system, which 
was “by no means an idle concern.”311 Those who supported 
universal admission argued that those in power could 
discriminate against those who were not, an idea borne out by 
the history of British blocking of newspapers.312 When the issue 
was framed as “what the British did” versus “what the British 
didn’t do,” the decision makers were bound to choose the 
positively framed choice—“what the British didn’t do.” 
This new idea, that all newspapers should be published 
regardless of content, was accepted as “tradition” by the 
twentieth century.313 This may have been path dependence at 
work: our current perception of political and economic 
outcomes determined by the timing in which the earlier 
decision was made. So, over time, this initial decision to 
universally accept all newspapers (itself the result of a framing 
effect), became Post Office tradition. 
Finally, once this idea had become entrenched Post 
Office tradition, a series of heuristics may have further 
entrenched it into constitutional law. Using the typology above, 
I argue that these cases reflect factor (1), because the Post 
Office cases were clearly not binding on the subsequent 
constitutional cases. To an extent, the cases also reflect factor 
(2), because the prior legal analysis regarding the Post Office 
effectively got “imported” into the constitutional cases. The 
motives to simplify and cohere are also at play. If the Court 
had started anew with the constitutional cases (not an 
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unreasonable proposition, since the cases were, after all, ones 
of first impression), arguably similar cases could have spawned 
multiple lines of doctrinal development. Adopting the Post 
Office line of doctrine in constitutional cases led to case law 
that was not only simpler (fewer lines of doctrine) but also 
more coherent (a single story to explain disparate phenomena). 
Over time, path dependence led us to apply these early 
precedents in cases that have nothing to with their origin. For 
example, the Ninth Circuit has recently held that an individual 
has a privacy interest in the contents of a text message, but not 
the number to which he was sending the text message.314 One 
has no such privacy interest because he has no such 
expectation in the to/from e-mail address in an e-mail message. 
And that is so because one has a privacy interest in his 
telephone conversation but not the numbers he has dialed. And 
that is so because—you see where this is going—you have a 
privacy interest in your letters, but not the address on the 
outside.315 
The point is not that these decisions are incorrect or 
even that they would not have come about in the absence of the 
early Post Office cases. Desai repeatedly, and explicitly, says 
that our existing set of doctrinal rules could very well have 
come about even in the absence of the Post Office statutes and 
cases.316 This underscores my overall theme in this Article: the 
fact that stare decisis reflects cognitive bias, in theory or in 
practice, does not necessarily mean that the decisions reached 
are incorrect. It merely means that we should be particularly 
vigilant about our reliance on prior decisions. 
3. Testing the Prediction III: The Global War on Terror  
Over the course of this Article, I have used the terms 
“precedent” and “stare decisis” mostly interchangeably, though 
doctrinally, there is a slight difference between the two (which 
is not relevant here).317 However, the idea of precedent, loosely 
defined, affects decision-making in all sorts of contexts beyond 
the law. Although this Article takes aim at the doctrine of 
  
 314 See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 905 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 315 Id. at 904-05. 
 316 See, e.g., Desai, Transformation, supra note 246 at 702 (“Although I do 
argue that the Post Office’s characteristics were embedded into the fabric of 
constitutional doctrine, I am not arguing that we would not have these two doctrines 
today without their origins in postal policy.”). 
 317 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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precedent in the law as commonly understood, it has broader 
application as well. As Schauer points out, 
Appeals to precedent do not reside exclusively in courts of law. 
Forms of argument that may be concentrated in the legal system are 
rarely isolated there, and the argument from precedent is a prime 
example of the nonexclusivity of what used to be called “legal 
reasoning.” . . . In countless instances, out of law as well as in, the 
fact that something was done before provides, by itself, a reason for 
doing it that way again.318 
The implications of my argument are reflected in a 
series of decisions regarding the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT). Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, the United States began detaining suspected terrorists at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.319 Two related issues arose: first, the 
permissible legal limits of the interrogation techniques the 
federal government could use against the detainees, and 
second, what, if any, legal process the detainees would have 
access to, including rights to habeas corpus or similar 
procedures.320 It is no exaggeration to say that the GWOT is 
unprecedented in its nature and scope. This novel situation 
provides a good test of the arguments I have advanced in this 
Article. 
In the first example, the government had to determine 
what interrogation techniques the military and intelligence 
officers could use on the detainees. By way of federal criminal 
law and international agreements, the United States was 
bound not to use “torture.”321 John Yoo, then at the Department 
of Justice, was given the unenviable task of defining what 
exactly constituted torture. 
Yoo has since been reviled by many for his callous 
formulation of what constituted torture.322 Yoo explained that 
one of the elements of torture was “severe pain or suffering” 
and that, “to constitute torture[,] ‘severe pain’ must rise to . . . 
  
 318 Schauer, Precedent, supra note 7, at 572. 
 319 See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: The Prisoners; First 
‘Unlawful Combatants’ Seized in Afghanistan Arrive at U.S. Base in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 12, 2002, at A7. 
 320 See, e.g., Daphne Eviatar, Foreigners’ Rights in the Post-9/11 Era: A 
Matter of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2003, at B7. 
 321 See 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2006) (prohibiting torture); id. § 2441 (prohibiting 
war crimes); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 463, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113. 
 322 See, e.g., Posting of Tim Dickinson to RollingStone.com’s National Affairs 
Blog, http://www.rollingstone.com/nationalaffairs/ (Apr. 2, 2009, 4:39 EST). 
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the level that would ordinarily be associated with a physical 
condition or injury sufficiently serious that it would result in 
death, organ failure, or serious impairment of body 
functions.”323 Far from reflecting Yoo’s heartlessness, however, 
the phrase reflects his susceptibility to the heuristics that 
affect all of us.  
As Yoo pointed out in an interview a few years after he 
authored the now-infamous memo, the question he faced in 
defining “severe pain or suffering” was, “has Congress ever 
used this phrase anywhere before?”324 Yoo found that Congress 
had in fact defined the phrase, in a statute that Yoo “th[ought] 
[] was about health care.”325 But there was more; the 
interviewer pressed Yoo on the issue: 
Esquire [Magazine interviewer]: John, you’re a very engaging guy, I 
like you—I can’t picture you writing that phrase “organ failure or 
death.”  
Yoo: It’s the phrase Congress used. The main criticism, which is 
certainly fair, is that statute is so different from this one, how can 
you borrow the language of one and include it in the other. On the 
other hand, that’s the closest you can get to any definition of that 
phrase at all.326 
The section of the memo that analyzed the meaning of 
“severe pain or suffering” is relatively short, less than a page of 
single-spaced text.327 The analysis began by noting that simple 
“pain or suffering” would be insufficient to constitute torture; 
18 U.S.C. § 2340 requires that such pain or suffering be 
“severe.”328 The statute, however, does not define “severe.” Yoo 
looked in two places to determine the definition of “severe . . . 
pain or suffering.”329 First, the memo laid out the dictionary 
definitions of severe.330 Second, the memo explained how the 
  
 323 Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Defense 38-39 (March 14, 
2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 324 “Torture Memo” Author John Yoo Responds to This Week’s Revelations, 
ESQUIRE, Apr. 3, 2008, available at http://www.esquire.com/the-side/qa/john-yoo-responds. 
 325 Id. 
 326 Id. (emphasis added). 
 327 Yoo, supra note 323, at 38-39. 
 328 Id. at 38 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 18 
U.S.C. § 2340 (2006)). 
 329 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 330 Id. 
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phrase “severe pain” was used in another Congressional 
statute:331  
Congress’s use of the phrase “severe pain” elsewhere in the U. S. 
Code can shed more light on its meaning. See, e.g., West Va. Univ. 
Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100 (1991) (“[W]e construe [a 
statutory term] to contain that permissible meaning which fits most 
logically and comfortably into the body of both previously and 
subsequently enacted law.”).332 
Yoo notes that in “statutes defining an emergency 
medical condition for the purpose of providing health 
benefits,”333 “severe pain” is treated “as an indicator of ailments 
that are likely to result in permanent and serious physical 
damage in the absence of immediate medical treatment. Such 
damage must rise to the level of death, organ failure, or the 
permanent, impairment of a significant body function.”334 
There are two points I want to make regarding Yoo’s 
analysis. First, as the case cited by Yoo itself notes, a statutory 
term is to be given a uniform definition across contexts only 
when doing so “fits . . . logically.”335 Arguably, using a definition 
relating emergency medical services in the torture context does 
not fit logically, and attempting to make it fit reflects the 
motives to cohere and simplify. 
Second, and more to the point, Yoo’s conclusion reflects 
at least factors (1), (2), and (3) laid out at the beginning of this 
Part. Obviously, Yoo’s memo is not a judicial decision, but the 
same principles apply. The analysis reflects factor (1) because 
Yoo is relying on prior analysis that is not binding in the 
“instant case.” In other words, the language Yoo relies on is not 
from any case involving torture, or even criminal law. There 
may have been reasons for doing so,336 but the fact remains that 
what Yoo relied on was not on point. 
Yoo’s memo also reflects factor (2), a relative lack of 
legal analysis. The background on § 2340 (and 2340A) and the 
discussion of the specific intent requirement are about twice as 
  
 331 Id. 
 332 Id. 
 333 Id. 
 334 Id. 
 335 W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100 (1991) 
 336 See Yoo, supra note 323, at 38 (“Although the[] [other] statutes address a 
substantially different subject from section 2340, they are nonetheless helpful for 
understanding what constitutes severe physical pain.”). Note, however, that Yoo does 
not explain why the other statutes are helpful; the sole reason appears to be that the 
other statute happens to use the phrase “severe pain.” 
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long as the section on “severe physical pain.”337 About half of the 
section on physical pain simply recites the dictionary definition 
of the word “severe,” and the only legal analysis on point is the 
discussion of the (arguably irrelevant) statutes.338 
Finally, Yoo’s memo reflects factor (3), resolving 
ambiguity in favor of the extant law. It is not unreasonable to 
think that the “unprecedented” attacks of September 11th 
would result in (and might even require) a legal analysis that 
did not rely on pre-existing doctrines and pre-existing, but 
unrelated, legal categories.  
These kinds of judgments, however, are precisely what 
my hypothesis would predict. Relying on “precedent” applies to 
all kinds of legal reasoning, not just judicial opinions. The 
motive to cohere and the motive to simplify are at work; the 
same standard is applied across contexts because doing so 
simplifies the realm of legal doctrine and brings coherence to 
an ambiguous area of torture law. The availability heuristic is 
also prominent: Yoo’s memo relies on the readily available 
formulation even though it did not, even by his own admission, 
bear directly on the issue at hand.  
The GWOT provides another occasion to examine the 
Supreme Court’s use of arguments about precedent. First, the 
mere fact that something has not previously been done is an 
argumentative trump, even at the Supreme Court.339 Second, 
this mode of reasoning applied even in cases raising questions 
about enemy combatants’ due process rights. In Rumsfeld v. 
Padilla, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, 
responded to Justice Stevens’s dissent by writing, “the dissent 
cannot cite a single case in which we have deviated from the 
longstanding rule we reaffirm today.”340 Justice Scalia, 
dissenting in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, complained that the 
majority “cannot cite a single case in the history of Anglo-
American law (before today) in which a jurisdiction-stripping 
provision was denied immediate effect in pending cases . . . .”341 
In both cases, the absence of a case on point was a crucial, if 
  
 337 See id. at 34-39. 
 338 See id. at 38-39. 
 339 See, e.g., Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 222 (2007) (“[R]espondents cite no 
case interpreting this provision” the way they do); Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 
U.S. 228, 247 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (Smith “cites no case for this proposition”); 
McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 26 (2002) (“Respondent fails to cite a single case from this 
Court” supporting its position). 
 340 542 U.S. 426, 449 (2004). 
 341 548 U.S. 557, 659 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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not dispositive, argument, so important that the relevant words 
were italicized. Yet, just as with Yoo’s memos, one might think 
that the GWOT might require novel legal or analytical 
approach.  
Yoo’s goal in writing the memo was to provide bright-
line rules regarding torture.342 This may or may not be a 
worthwhile goal. But my point is a different one: even in a war 
that presented “unprecedented dangers,”343 a critical juncture of 
the issue presented—how much physical pain is so severe as to 
constitute torture—relies on quite ordinary, and to some extent 
cursory, legal analysis. Although the importance of the law and 
policy issues at stake prompted careful legal analysis, it was 
impossible to completely eliminate the effect of cognitive bias 
on the legal conclusions. This underscores my overall point. It’s 
not only difficult to overcome these cognitive biases: because 
the biases operate subconsciously, it is often impossible.  
B. Truth or Stability?344 
Earlier, I quoted Adrian Vermeule and pointed out that 
“[t]he key point is not that judges are likely to get things 
wrong; it is that when they do get things wrong, they are likely 
to err in systematic rather than random ways.”345 Vermeule’s 
point applies to my analysis as well. The key point is not just 
that we humans have certain cognitive biases; it is that when 
our decisions are skewed, they are likely to be skewed in 
systematic rather than in random ways.346 
  
 342 See “Torture Memo” Author John Yoo Responds to This Week’s Revelations, 
supra note 324. 
 343 George W. Bush, U.S. President, The President’s State of the Union 
Address (Jan. 29, 2002). 
 344 Thanks to Zachary Clopton and Frederick Schauer for (separately) 
highlighting this issue for me. 
 345 Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism, supra note 23, at 1501. 
 346 This is not to suggest that there are not countervailing cognitive biases. 
For example, some combination of optimism bias and overconfidence may lead 
individuals to shun existing arrangements in favor of their own, idiosyncratic views. 
See, e.g., Antonio E. Bernardo & Ivo Welch, On the Evolution of Overconfidence and 
Entrepreneurs 1-2 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 00-48, 2001), available at 
http://ssrn.com/papers=275516. Bernardo and Welch argue that the overconfident—
those who, presumably, are less likely to exhibit the biases I describe in Part III.A—are 
more likely to be entrepreneurs and risk-takers. See generally id. There are two 
responses. First, the literature demonstrates far more “backward-looking” biases than 
“forward-looking” biases. Second, the people Bernardo and Welch identify are, by 
definition, the exception. My Article, on the other hand, is aimed at the characteristics 
that are reflected in most people’s behavior, most of the time. 
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Then the question is, “So what?” Maybe our expressed 
preferences—as humans, as citizens, as lawyers—are unduly 
weighted toward the past. Is this really problematic? Maybe 
the law is “wrong” as measured against some idealized notion 
of humans’ preferences (if such an ideal could even be 
extrapolated), but this may not pose any practical problems. If 
the law is not meant to embody some intrinsic truth, but 
instead is merely meant to be stable and predictable, then this 
problem seems illusory. 
For example, if we are not concerned about the 
substantive content of the law, then it does not matter whether 
there is an implied private right of action under section 304 or 
not. So long as a rule is established, and relatively unlikely to 
change over time, then the law is at least stable and 
corporations and shareholders can act accordingly. For 
example, instead of repeatedly litigating the section 304 
question, shareholders might focus on other causes of action 
and thus save resources. Moreover, acute awareness of the 
possibility of bias might require judges to constantly re-
evaluate legal rules, putting the rules in a state of flux and 
making them unpredictable and unstable.  
However, I argue that this problem is overblown. Even 
if law is merely meant to foster stability, and even if we are 
completely agnostic about the substantive content of the law, 
my analysis poses problems with the doctrine of stare decisis 
whether we are concerned about truth, stability, or both. 
C. Problems in Both Cases, and Some Solutions 
Imagine that you have a gun that, due to some 
mechanical error, always fires slightly (but somewhat 
  
  I should note (as may already be apparent to some readers!) that my 
analysis is not perfect. One hundred percent of the population is not biased toward the 
status quo; some people may buck the trend in the face of even the most forceful 
cascade. Just because most people will demonstrate some quality most of the time does 
not mean all people will do so all of the time. However, as Hanson and Yosifon write in 
The Situation, 
[T]o best promote human understanding and well-being, legal theories must 
be anchored in a reality-based understanding of human thinking and 
behavior. Realism, we think, is critical. To be realists, on this telling, means 
to begin with real humans and to build models from there, rather than to 
begin with models and then view and interpret humans through them. 
Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 20, at 183. Even if there are exceptions, 
policymaking must generally be based on how most people will react to a given 
situation. 
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unpredictably) to the left of where it is aimed. Now imagine 
that the error is brought to your attention. What do you do? 
Broadly speaking, there are three options. First, you might 
decide that your gun’s aim is off enough that you buy a new 
gun, one that does not have this error. Second, you might 
decide that the slight unpredictability is not reason enough to 
buy a new gun, so you will just aim slightly to the right from 
now on and correct the gun’s bias. Finally, you might decide 
that you generally want to shoot to the left anyway, and that 
therefore you won’t change much at all. The gun’s “leftness” is 
a good thing to be aware of, but since it generally gets you 
where you want to wind up, it is not going to affect your 
actions. 
This analogy tracks the argument made in this Article. 
The evidence put forth in Part III suggests that our court 
decisions will tend, for situational and psychological reasons, to 
be rooted in history, tradition, and precedent. The theory I 
infer predicts that we will choose these existing arrangements, 
not because they are the best of all possible worlds, but merely 
because they exist. In other words, our jurisprudential gun will 
always shoot slightly to the left. However, the evidence does 
not provide perfect predictive power. Precedent is sometimes 
disregarded and cases do get overruled. Thus, although our 
decisions are rooted in the past, it is not possible to predict 
with complete certainty how firm the roots are and when they 
will be broken. 
And so, broadly speaking, there are three alternatives. I 
term these the strong case, the middle case, and the weaker 
case. In the strong case, stare decisis is fundamentally 
unworkable, so the only option is to buy a new gun. In the 
middle case, stare decisis is seen as a “thumb on the scale” for 
the cold hand of the past. Aware of this information, we might 
aim slightly to the right, by lessening but not eliminating our 
dependence on stare decisis. In the weaker case, the theory 
offers very little. It sheds some light on reasons why our 
jurisprudential gun aims to the left, but if we want a system 
that is resistant to change, then we may simply decide that the 
cognitive biases outlined above do not change the systemic 
calculus (and may, in fact, provide reasons why the current 
system is preferable). I discuss each of these possibilities in 
turn. 
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1. The Strong Case 
The strongest form of the argument is that the legal 
system reflects cognitive shortcomings and nothing more, so we 
should scrap stare decisis and look to another way to 
adjudicate cases. Under the strong case, judges should not 
follow precedent other than as a last resort. 
In the strongest form of the argument, our cognitive 
biases and heuristics make reliance on precedent unreliable. 
Therefore, courts should essentially engage in “de novo review” 
every time. A court would not be barred from following 
precedent—such a rule would be patently absurd—but there 
would be a strong presumption against doing so. On appellate 
review, a court would critically examine the lower court’s 
citation to precedent. The appellate court would be especially 
vigilant to monitor whether the district court was following 
precedent as a heuristic, for example, by evaluating the district 
court’s decision as measured against the five factors outlined in 
the previous part.347 Moreover, in the strongest form of the 
argument, not only would the practice of stare decisis reflect 
cognitive bias, but the doctrine itself could be seen as arising as 
a reflection of bias—and nothing more. 
2. The Middle Case 
The “middle ground” of this argument considers stare 
decisis (history, precedent, stability) as one set of factors 
among many to consider when deciding legal rules. Under this 
“middle ground,” precedent should generally be respected, but 
the burden of proof is on the one who wants to maintain the 
status quo. 
The middle ground can be illustrated with an example: 
Consider a legal dispute and a given set of facts. Assume 
further that the correct answer to this legal question is X, 
another reasonable answer is Y, and an unreasonable answer 
is Z. Under the current system of stare decisis, if an appeals 
court concludes Z, that conclusion is binding on all lower courts 
  
 347 For example, if the question of a private right of action had come up on 
appeal in iBasis, the reviewing court should have been wary of the decision below 
because there are strong grounds to think that the iBasis court relied on precedent—
and non-binding precedent at that—as a heuristic. As it was, the iBasis appeal was 
voluntarily dismissed so the court never reached the merits. Judgment, In re iBasis, 
Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 08-2055 (1st Cir. Feb. 20, 2009). 
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and on itself.348 Under the “middle ground” that I propose here, 
a subsequent court might reason as follows: An earlier court 
concluded Z. However, after reviewing the basis for that 
conclusion, we conclude that it was incorrect. Therefore, we 
conclude X. Under this regime, a court would have the 
flexibility to depart from precedent and review the rule anew. 
In other words, the subsequent court would review the earlier 
case out of a concern that it would follow the prior rule as a 
heuristic rather than because of the informational content 
contained in the rule.  
However, once the subsequent court concluded X or Y, 
that rule would be binding on subsequent courts. In other 
words, so long as the precedential rule was reasonable, it would 
be binding; courts would only be free to revisit precedent if they 
were convinced the earlier rule was incorrect.  
3. The Weaker Case 
The weaker case is that all my theory offers is a 
“tweak.” Under the existing doctrine, for example, the Supreme 
Court will not overrule its earlier precedent unless it has 
become demonstrably erroneous and unworkable.349 Under the 
weakest version of the theory, this Article highlights one 
phenomenon that should go into the calculus when Justices are 
determining whether a given precedent is demonstrably 
erroneous or unworkable. At the lower court level, if judges 
could think of any plausible reason for sticking with the 
existing rule, then they should do it. Under the weakest 
version of my argument, lower courts will almost never be 
justified in deviating from the existing rule. The only possible 
exception might be in, for example, a SOX section 304 case in 
the District of Massachusetts or some other district that 
decided the private right of action question “late in the game,” 
so to speak. If, after an analysis like mine, a court was 
convinced to a high degree of probability that the existing rule 
was the result of a cascade, the court might be justified in 
deviating from the rule. Even under this conception, though, a 
  
 348 See, e.g., United States v. Humphrey, 2002 Fed.App. 0131P (6th Cir.), 
overruled on other grounds by United States v. Leachman, 2002 Fed.App. 0353P (6th 
Cir.) (explaining that a given Sixth Circuit panel is bound to follow precedential 
authority from another panel even if current panel is inclined to disagree with prior 
decision). 
 349 See Nelson, supra note 54, at 1-3. 
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lower court would probably never be justified in refusing to 
follow a higher court’s rule. 
D. An Important Qualification 
Imagine that I want to know if it will rain tomorrow.350 
You come to me and say, “I believe it will rain tomorrow.” I 
take this piece of information and add it to the available data I 
have. Eventually, I use your information when I decide 
whether or not it will rain tomorrow (and presumably, your 
comment makes me somewhat more likely to think it will rain 
tomorrow). 
But now imagine that I asked you how you know it will 
rain tomorrow, and you say, “It came to me in a dream.” You 
didn’t check the weather report, or look at your barometer, or 
collect any sort of data. Now, my faith in the epistemic basis of 
your claim is shaken, and your claim carries less weight than it 
otherwise would. However—and this is key—the fact that your 
information came to you in a dream does not bear at all on 
whether it will actually rain tomorrow. Maybe it will, for 
reasons related to your dream or not, but the sensible thing for 
me to do (ex ante) is to discount your assertion. 
This analogy applies to my argument. It may be that 
stare decisis is desirable for a variety of reasons. However, the 
social psychological evidence suggests that we believe in stare 
decisis because it “came to us in a dream.” Of course I don’t 
mean that literally, but just as in the weather example above, 
the epistemic basis of our faith in stare decisis is called into 
question. The mere presence of cognitive bias can never tell us 
that our decision is wrong. Biases can only tell us that the 
reasons we think our decision was right are unreliable.  
This qualification relates to the way I have referred to 
the psychological studies in this Article. If a coffee mug is 
“worth” five dollars, then we might say that it is irrational or 
otherwise “suboptimal” for a person to sell it for no less than 
ten dollars. In this instance, “suboptimal” would mean that the 
person made the wrong substantive decision: she should have 
sold the mug for five dollars but instead held out for ten to no 
avail. 
I am not arguing that stare decisis is suboptimal in that 
sense. For example, Casey declined to overrule Roe, in part 
  
 350 Thanks to Adrian Vermeule for this example, which I adopt from his 
telling almost verbatim (to the best of my recollection). 
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because of considerations of stare decisis. One might read my 
argument to be that (1) stare decisis is rooted in cognitive bias; 
(2) bias leads to substantively suboptimal results; and 
therefore (3) Casey should have overruled Roe. 
But that misreads my argument. My Article takes no 
position on whether Casey should have overruled Roe or any 
other substantive question. The behavioral phenomena I 
outlined earlier will never prove that a decision was wrong, or 
even that it was the product of bias. Indeed, some of the 
psychological literature argues that heuristics are not 
substantively suboptimal at all.351 My point is not that the 
decisions were suboptimal in every case where precedent was 
followed. My point is that the reasons for arriving at that 
decision are suspect. 
Another point worth noting: I am arguing for a 
decreased reliance on precedent in our system, but not for 
judges to be oblivious to rulings in earlier, like cases. At its 
inception, the doctrine of stare decisis did most of its work in 
making the law “common”—that is, in making legal rules 
standard across the various English counties. Certainly, 
uniformity is a desirable goal for any legal system, and (at least 
to some extent) advocates defend stare decisis on similar 
grounds today, arguing that it makes the law more stable, 
predictable, and efficient.352 
Today, the “information sharing” function of stare 
decisis is significantly less important. With every published 
decision, and many unpublished decisions, available on 
Westlaw or Lexis within a matter of months (at most), search 
costs are dramatically lower. Judges are in a position to signal 
to each other in a way that they were not eight hundred or a 
thousand years ago. 
Moreover, judges can and should learn from each other 
through this information-sharing. Even in the strongest case, 
procedurally rejecting stare decisis does not mean that judges 
are required to ignore other (correct) decisions. It does not even 
mean that judges should go out of their way to avoid the prior 
results. It merely means that stare decisis carries no normative 
weight, whereas in today’s jurisprudential system it is almost 
always dispositive. 
  
 351 See, e.g., GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US 
SMART (1999). 
 352 See supra Part II.B. 
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This leads to another point: even in the strongest case, 
even if the doctrine of stare decisis is eliminated altogether, 
judges will still rely on precedent. Suppose that my analysis is 
correct. (After all, that would be the only reason to decrease our 
reliance on precedent.) The phenomena catalogued in Part III 
suggest that, even in the absence of a formal mechanism by 
which judges are obliged to rely on prior decisions, they will do 
so anyway. In other words, even if the doctrine of stare decisis 
were to be eliminated in one fell swoop, my hypothesis implies 
that judges will still be relying on prior decisions in some 
manner. Thus, we would not completely lose the benefits that 
stare decisis provides. 
E. Will the World Come to an End? (No.) 
Stare decisis is defended on a variety of grounds.353 If the 
hypothesis I advocate takes hold, and prior judicial decisions 
have diminished sway—even in like cases—will the legal 
system fall apart at the seams? If stare decisis “controls the 
caprice of judges by requiring them to suppose that all similar 
future cases will be decided according to their instant 
decision,”354 a weaker role for precedent might encourage the 
caprice of judges. If stare decisis is “prudential and 
pragmatic,”355 a weaker role for precedent might lead to 
imprudent and impractical outcomes. If stare decisis enables 
efficiency, a weaker role for precedent might throw parties’ 
prospective planning into disarray and harm our country’s 
economic prospects. 
I do not dwell on these possible objections to my 
argument because I find them to be a canard. First, as others 
have pointed out, the increasing number of unpublished 
dispositions at the court of appeals level and oral decisions at 
the district court level means that a large number of cases are 
taken out of the “stare decisis database,” so to speak. Second, 
as Nelson has thoroughly explained, a decreased reliance on 
stare decisis by no means suggests that chaos will reign. Third, 
it is unlikely that a decreased reliance on stare decisis will 
undermine efficiency goals, as it is unclear whether the current 
system furthers those goals in the first place. Fourth, stare 
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decisis may in some cases undermine, rather than further, 
judicial legitimacy. 
First, courts frequently, and by some accounts 
increasingly, rely on unpublished dispositions (at the appeals 
level) or oral dispositions (at the trial level).356 Even though 
some of these decisions may be available via online databases, 
litigants are instructed not to cite them.357 Schmier and Schmier 
argue that the “abandonment” of stare decisis—through the 
use of unpublished dispositions—is detrimental to the 
democratic process.358 Whatever the merits of their argument, it 
is clear that if ninety-three percent of cases are decided without 
a published opinion, and where the practice has not had a 
tremendous destabilizing, delegitimizing, or efficiency-
impeding effect on the law, a decreased reliance on stare 
decisis will probably not wreak havoc on the rule of law. 
Second, and at a deeper level, a decreased reliance on 
stare decisis does not mean that courts should decide cases 
based on a whim. In his article, Stare Decisis and 
Demonstrably Erroneous Precedent, Caleb Nelson argues (for a 
variety of reasons unrelated to my Article) that stare decisis 
should not carry the almost-dispositive weight that it does 
under the current regime.359 But Nelson does not argue—and 
neither do I—that judges should be entirely free to make any 
decision they want in a given case. Instead, Nelson adapts the 
administrative law model of Chevron360 deference.361 Under 
Chevron, a reviewing court will defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute so long as that interpretation is 
“permissible,” even if the court would have chosen a different 
interpretation in the first instance.362 A reviewing court is not 
bound by the agency’s interpretation if it is “impermissible.”363 
Nelson proposes that a similar framework apply to stare 
decisis.364 A lower court should be permitted to disagree with 
the stare decisis-given rule (to an extent that varies depending 
on which version of my theory is adopted), but its discretion 
would be limited, essentially by a reasonableness side 
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constraint. Under such a system, erroneous or otherwise 
improper precedents would be more likely to be abandoned. 
The reviewing court should then uphold the lower court unless 
it is “impermissible,” i.e., if it has no reasonable basis in law or 
fact—or if it relied on stare decisis as a heuristic. 
Nelson argues persuasively that a weaker version of 
stare decisis is likely to lead to a net benefit.365 Among other 
things, the weaker version of stare decisis will lead to more 
overruling of prior decisions and, presumably, the law 
becoming more “correct” as a result. But this benefit is not 
without cost; as courts engage in more overruling, the law 
could become more uncertain and potentially unstable. Yet it is 
not necessarily clear that the current system, with a stronger 
form of stare decisis, is free from such uncertainty. After all, 
when legal questions are clear, individuals would probably not 
litigate them; the mere fact of litigation often signals that we 
are in a gray area. In those cases, the law would not be 
substantially more uncertain under a weaker version of stare 
decisis. And when litigants do bring a question where the 
correct answer is clear (or well-established, or easy to 
ascertain) there is a very good chance that judges will adhere 
to that correct answer, under any system of stare decisis, 
strong or weak.366 As Nelson points out, even under a weaker 
regime, the law is more likely to move toward correct decisions, 
even if subsequent courts are as likely to be error-prone as 
their predecessors.367 
This kind of a system is not—if you will excuse the 
pun—unprecedented. Appellate courts routinely affirm lower 
court rulings with which they might, writing on a blank slate, 
decide differently. For example, courts will affirm an agency’s 
adjudication so long as it is supported by substantial evidence, 
even if the court would have reached a different conclusion. 
When there is an appeal following trial, all inferences are 
drawn in favor of the jury’s verdict; the jury’s verdict is 
affirmed so long as there is any evidence that supports it. 
Issues not properly preserved for appeal are routinely reviewed 
for “plain error,” meaning that a court’s conclusion is upheld 
unless there is no reasonable basis for the lower court’s ruling. 
In short, there are already a wide range of cases where an 
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appeals court will uphold a decision it might disagree with, so 
long as it has some basis in law or fact.  
Now imagine that a case presents certain facts. One 
judge might reach one conclusion, X, that is reasonable under 
the circumstances. Some time later, on similar facts, another 
judge might conclude Y. If the standard of review is plain error, 
an appeals court—the same appeals court—could very well 
permit both decisions to stand under the status quo. This is not 
much different from the result that would obtain under a 
system with a weaker reliance on precedent. 
Third, it is highly unlikely that a system with decreased 
reliance on stare decisis will undermine efficiency goals 
(bracketing the question of whether economic efficiency should 
be the goal of a system of justice at all). For example, Stake 
wrote in a recent article that the demise of the fee tail estate 
demonstrates the efficiency of the common law: the fee tail, by 
holding that only first-born sons could inherit property, was 
inefficient; the common law ultimately abolished the fee tail, 
suggesting that the common law moves toward efficiency.368 
However, as Hirsch points out in a persuasive reply, the 
common law is not a natural system that arose of its own 
accord; “it is also, through and through, a participatory system. 
Human participation cannot but leave its indelible stamp.”369 
That stamp, he argues, includes phenomena such as the 
stickiness of legal rules, status quo bias, and the availability 
heuristic.370 In other words, these psychological phenomena 
undercut the common-law-as-efficiency hypothesis, even in a 
very limited context (fee tails and other perpetuities). 
Along these lines, no less a titan in the law and 
economics field than Judge Richard Posner (and co-authors) 
looked at the Economic Loss Rule in tort law, the doctrine 
which holds one cannot sue for economic loss without physical 
injury under certain circumstances. The doctrine arose around 
the 1960s and 70s, and its application gained ground in various 
states over time.371 Yet after conducting a detailed empirical 
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analysis, Posner and his co-authors conclude that the law did 
not converge on any given point, evolved inconsistently, and, 
under almost any interpretation, did not converge on 
efficiency.372 Of course, this does not mean that no legal rules 
ever converge on efficiency. It does, however, mean that any 
critique of my argument that suggests that my proposal will 
throw into whack an already-efficient system is, at best, 
incomplete, and at worst, flat wrong. 
Fourth, although stare decisis is thought to further the 
legitimacy of the judicial system (by controlling the caprice of 
individual judges), it may in some cases have the opposite 
effect. As noted above,373 it is not uncommon for district courts 
to adhere to a rule while telling the parties that they disagree 
with that rule. In a typical court case, one party is on the losing 
side. The losing party may come to view the court as less 
legitimate for sticking to a rule that it acknowledges is 
incorrect or otherwise inapplicable.  
Finally, it is worth noting that a critique against my 
Article’s premise contains the seeds of its own response. To put 
it another way: I assume at the outset of this Article that stare 
decisis has a constraining effect on judges and that effect 
pushes decisions toward the past. Reasoning from that 
premise, and on the basis of psychological evidence, I conclude 
that stare decisis should have a diminished role in our 
jurisprudential system. 
However, some people argue that stare decisis already 
does very little work to constrain judges because (1) judges are 
simply enacting their own political preferences, (2) there is so 
much prior case law, encompassing so many sets of facts, that 
“precedent” can be used to justify virtually any position, or (3) 
both.374 I find this argument to be unpersuasive. The 
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overwhelming majority of cases are simply not politically 
charged, so that political preferences do not even enter the 
equation. Indeed, even at the Supreme Court, unanimity is not 
uncommon: of the seventy-five full opinions published in the 
2007 term of the Supreme Court, nearly one-third of them had 
no dissenting opinion.375  
If judges are already unconstrained by precedent, then 
the parade of horribles that will supposedly ensue should 
already be happening. The legal realists’ theories acknowledge, 
implicitly or explicitly, that the fact that legal decisions reflect 
political preferences does not, ipso facto, throw the law into flux 
because most decisions are not political. Similarly, I 
acknowledge explicitly that the fact that we should decrease 
reliance on stare decisis will not, ipso facto, throw the law into 
flux. Moreover, if anything, an obligation to follow precedent 
creates a tremendous first-mover advantage for the first court 
to address a given question. For example, it might be the case 
that the district judge in Neer came out against the 
shareholder plaintiffs because he harbored some animus 
against shareholders (or whatever). Because other courts have 
followed Neer almost blindly, that initial judge’s policy 
preferences have been enacted across the country. Stare decisis 
may not limit the role of policy preferences; it may simply 
change whose policy preferences get furthered—the first 
judge’s. 
There is one final point I want to make. In his 1999 
article, Talley concludes that precedent cannot be explained as 
an information cascade.376 First, he writes that cascades are 
unlikely to occur because of the possibility of appellate 
review.377 However, as Guthrie and George point out, the 
overwhelming majority of cases are affirmed on appeal, 
suggesting that appellate review is not as robust as Talley 
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assumes.378 Second, he argues that cascades are unlikely 
because we know not only what courts did but also why they 
did it, by way of their written opinions.379 However, as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley example demonstrates, courts often dispose of 
a case with little or no written explanation, suggesting that the 
mere fact of a written opinion is not dispositive in determining 
if a cascade is at work. Third, Talley suggests that cascades are 
unlikely because judges are heterogeneous and have competing 
considerations.380 However, in this line of argument, Talley 
underestimates the strong institutional ethos (not to mention 
the cognitive and behavioral factors) that weigh strongly in 
favor of following precedent. 
But Talley is right in this regard—it is difficult to 
identify a cascade and it is difficult to identify cognitive bias at 
work. However, I have tried to identify some factors that could 
help in making that determination. In conjunction, these 
factors give us at least more persuasive—even if not 
conclusive—evidence. For example, in the context of the 
unconscionability doctrine, Talley says that it is hard to 
identify a cascade.381 However, he focuses on only one factor 
(following the decision of a non-binding court).382 I have 
identified other factors. These are not infallible or exhaustive. 
They do, however, move us closer to knowing when bias is at 
work. 
It is true that appellate review might halt or reverse a 
district court cascade. But if the Supreme Court hears very few 
cases (it does), and if the courts of appeal affirm the 
overwhelming majority of cases (they do), then a district court 
cascade such as the one I identified earlier bodes poorly for 
defenders of stare decisis.  
V. CONCLUSION: A WAY OUT 
For a very long time—varying a bit by whom you ask—
the practice of stare decisis has been the cornerstone of Anglo-
American jurisprudence. We are taught that present-day courts 
should follow the lead of their predecessors because (1) the 
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earlier courts are more likely to have reached the correct 
answer; (2) sticking with the status quo rule fosters stability, 
predictability, and efficiency; and (3) the practice furthers 
judicial legitimacy. 
Yet as scores of studies from a variety of disciplines 
show, we are not rational actors coldly picking the best solution 
to a given legal problem. We take mental shortcuts and deviate 
from rationality in ways we aren’t even aware. We are primed 
to prefer existing social and political systems, and we place an 
undue weight on tradition and the status quo. If we see others 
making a given decision, we tend to follow that decision, 
believing that others know best even when our “private stock of 
reason” tells us otherwise. In short, our decisions are biased 
and the biases are correlated.  
If our biases were random, we might take some comfort 
knowing that they might all cancel out. But they are not 
random. We are cognitively primed to subconsciously prefer 
precedent—and then, instead of correcting that bias, we built a 
legal system that requires courts to follow precedent. We would 
do well to look at this practice with a critical eye.  
Hanson and Yosifon write that, in developing legal 
theory, we ought to begin with descriptions of real human 
actors and work from there.383 Similarly, the law would be more 
honest, more accurate—and, yes, more just—if we cast that 
same critical eye on judicial decision-making. 
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